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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Attracting international labour over the medium- to long-term is a crucial 
strategic issue for the European Union: demographic challenges, enhanced European 
global competitiveness, sustained European growth and the survival of welfare systems 
over the next decades, all depend on it.  
However, EU labour migration policy has received very little attention from policy-
makers, media and the public in general, even in the framework of the recent proposal for 
a European Migration Agenda.  
As a matter of fact, the EU has no comprehensive set of policy instruments to cope 
with the international labour required by its labour markets. There are several 
reasons to undertake the development of a more coherent and more comprehensive legal 
labour migration policy framework in the EU: 
- Non-economic migrants (family reunification, refugees and foreign students) amount to 
between two thirds and three quarters of all third-country nationals entering the EU labour 
market; 
- Labour migration policy is the only instrument allowing the selection of skilled migrants 
with the qualifications and skills required by European labour markets; 
- Effective legal labour migration channels are a necessary component of any strategy to 
fight irregular labour migration; 
- Legal migration is a key component of international bilateral migration policy dialogues 
between the EU and its partner countries, in particular Mobility Partnership with 
Neighbourhood countries. A coherent EU labour migration policy framework is required to 
integrate this issue into policy dialogues.  
 
As a consequence, an EU labour migration policy framework should be an integral 
part of the emerging EU labour market and employment policies. 
 
The political sensitiveness of immigration policy and the exclusive competence of 
Member States to decide the volume of admissions of third-country nationals seeking 
work are two major constraints on any policy initiative in this field. 
 
Structure and main conclusions 
 
This paper first reviews available evidence on the need for labour migration from 
third countries to the European Union. Today, in most Member States high 
unemployment and underemployment levels coexist with substantial labour shortages as 
perceived by employers. Whereas there is not an overall quantitative labour shortage for 
the whole EU, several studies find the existence of qualitative labour market 
shortages for specific skill levels, sectors or occupations, in particular for low-
skilled occupations. Highly-skilled profiles are, instead, needed only in a limited number 
of occupations and countries. Accordingly, any strategy addressing labour needs in the EU 
– including highly-skilled migration schemes – should be geared to national labour 
markets’ needs and be strongly sector-oriented.  
 
By looking at the different forecasts available, it can be seen that international 
migration is poised to play a major role in filling the EU’s labour market needs. 
Accordingly, redesigning pro-immigration policies should be a complementary response to 
current and future European labour supply dynamics.  
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This paper, also, reviews the gradual development of an EU-wide legal framework 
on economic migration and its current status. After a 2001 attempt to adopt a 
comprehensive approach to economic migration to the EU, EU legislation has opted for a 
“category-by-category” approach. To date this has focused on students and 
researchers, highly-qualified migrants, seasonal workers and intra-corporate 
transferees. There is also a proposal recasting the Directives on foreign students 
and on researchers that has not yet been adopted. Assessments of the 
implementation of the Researchers Directive (2011) and the Blue Card Directive on highly-
qualified migrants (2014) show low rates of use. In both cases, as with the Seasonal 
Workers Directive, the wide powers of discretion retained by Member States and 
insufficient promotion of the existence of new rules undermines the potential of directives. 
Beyond the conditions of admission, the intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals 
remains a key component of EU labour migration policy and one of the biggest 
failures in European immigration policy. Overall, the EU labour migration system lacks 
effective coordination mechanisms between Member States for policy implementation at 
the EU level.  
The paper, next, looks at the existing evidence for the impact of EU migration 
policies on migration flows in the labour market, as well as the integration 
challenges posed by the arrival of third-country nationals. Available data do not 
allow for a thorough assessment of the impact and effectiveness of immigration policies on 
migrant flows and – especially – on migrant composition in terms of reasons for entrance: 
family reunification beneficiaries, refugees, workers and students. Only very limited 
quantitative studies have been conducted in a systematic and comparative way at the EU 
level. This lack of data and research severely limits our ability to understand and design an 
evidence-based EU labour migration policy. 
 
However, the low level of use of EU labour migration policy tools, such as the Researchers 
Directive or the Blue Card Directive, suggests that the impact of EU labour migration 
policy on migratory movements is very limited.  
 
Empirical evidence reveals that migrants do not integrate into the labour market 
to the same extent as native workers. They have lower wages and are more likely to 
be unemployed than native workers with the same characteristics.  
 
Regarding the proposal for a European Agenda on Migration presented by the 
European Commission on 13 May 2015, the chapter on “A new policy on legal migration” 
does not contain major novelties in relation to the current EU labour immigration regime. 
The proposals lack a clear vision of future EU labour migration policy and its integration 
with labour market and employment policy. They do not build a comprehensive and 
coherent policy set and they do not make up for the shortcomings of current EU labour 
migration policies. Overall, they are not suited to respond to the identified and projected 
labour needs of the European Union over the medium- to long-term. However, they open a 
unique opportunity to discuss EU labour migration policy: this opportunity should not be 
wasted.  
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Main recommendations 
 
In this regard, the paper calls for a comprehensive labour market vision of EU 
economic migration regime. The current piecemeal, category-specific approach to legal 
labour migration at the EU-level does not respond to the needs of EU labour markets, 
which are subject to a process of gradual unification.  
 
Indeed, EU labour migration policy should be an integral part of EU labour 
market policy. As such, it should incorporate measures facilitating the labour market 
integration of all flows of third-country nationals into the EU labour markets. This would 
include not only economic migrants entering the EU labour market with a work permit, but 
also all third-country nationals ultimately accessing European labour markets. Here there 
are, also, family reunification beneficiaries, asylum-seekers and foreign students. 
 
An operationalization of the EU preference principle is crucial to ensuring the 
smooth implementation of any EU-wide labour migration scheme and the 
articulation between international migration and the intra-EU mobility of EU nationals. 
 
Social partners and social dialogue mechanisms are a necessary component of 
any EU labour migration initiative. They both define an EU labour migration policy 
responding to the actual needs of the labour market and defuse misrepresentations of 
migrants in political discourse and public opinion. 
 
A public information and communication strategy on the realities of migration 
and the need for a comprehensive labour migration policy at EU level should be an 
integral part of any policy debate in this field, given the strong anti-immigration attitudes 
in wide sectors of public opinion in many Member States.  
 
Legal labour migration opportunities to the EU should be integrated into EU 
migration agreements with third countries (such as Mobility Partnerships), as well as 
mechanisms to facilitate the labour and skills matching for migrant workers from those 
countries. This would allow the articulation between EU labour migration policy and EU 
external cooperation in this field. 
 
More precise and disaggregated migration statistics should be collected at the EU 
level, and the current Commission Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum could be 
transformed into a fully-fledged EU-wide migration policy review mechanism. 
 
Last, but not least, more research and better production of data are crucial in any 
effective evidence-based labour migration policy at the EU level. More research is 
needed, in particular, in the following areas: 
- Labour market integration of non-economic migrants; 
- Patterns of intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals legally residing in the EU; 
- Mechanisms to better match the profile of labour migrants to the needs of the EU 
labour markets; 
- The actual implementation and working of labour market tests in different EU 
Member States. 
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Policy options to open new avenues for legal labour migration to 
the EU 
 
The paper briefly reviews a series of concrete policy options for widening the legal 
channels for access to the European labour market in response to identified labour market 
needs. The analysis of existing options allows some conclusions on the right mix of policy 
instruments to integrate into a comprehensive labour market approach. The main 
objectives would be the following: ensuring a more efficient international labour matching 
of migrant workers; optimizing the labour force already present in the EU; fitting legal 
migration channels to the needs of the European labour markets; and ensuring the 
availability of a sufficient pool of potential labour migrants for employers. In terms of 
policy instruments, an analysis of existing options suggests the following conclusions: 
 
1. Improving labour matching within and outside the EU 
 
 An EU-wide Labour Market Information System and an EU labour market 
needs a forecasting system integrating migration flows of non-economic 
migrants. Both are the basis of any effective, evidence-based labour migration 
policy at the EU level. The former can be used to facilitate international labour 
matching for third-country nationals and to operationalize the principle of EU 
preference and to ensure a better matching of labour migration policy outcomes to 
the actual needs of EU labour markets. 
 Current EU and Member States job intermediation mechanisms (notably 
public employment services matching systems) could be extended to third 
country nationals, in particular through partnerships with public employment 
services in countries of origin. An obvious step there would be to extend the 
European Job Mobility Portal, EURES, to third countries, in particular Neigbourhood 
countries in the framework of Mobility Partnerships. 
 The role of private placement agencies in international labour migration 
matching should be enhanced and regulated, for instance through the 
development of a system of certified international recruitment agencies. 
 
2. Optimizing the labour force already present in the EU 
 
 The labour market integration of non-economic migrants has to be 
supported, first by getting a better knowledge of their skills and facilitating 
changes in migratory status;  
 The intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals legally working in EU Member 
States should be facilitated; and the targeted regularization of irregular 
migrants for whom there is labour market demand should be incentivized.  
 
3. Fitting legal migration channels to the needs of the European labour markets 
 
 The ongoing reform of the EU Blue Card should impose fewer costs on 
migrants and employers and grant more rights, in particular to intra-EU mobility, 
to Blue Card holders. 
 Targeted and occupation-specific job search visas might be a more effective 
instrument to match EU labour migration policy to EU labour market needs than 
supply-driven “expression-of-interest” system, as suggested in the European 
Agenda on Migration.  
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4. Extending the pool of potential labour migrants for employers 
 
 Foreign students graduating in EU education institutions should have some 
opportunity to access EU labour markets, enhancing thus the attractiveness of the 
EU destination, and an EU Traineeship Programme for third-country 
nationals could be a building block to facilitate the smooth integration into of 
third-country nationals with the required skills.  
 More generally, the recognition and certification of qualifications and 
skills obtained in third countries by third-country nationals should be made 
easier and progress towards an EU-wide recognition system should be envisaged. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY IS THERE A NEED FOR NEW EU 
LEGISLATION ON LABOUR MIGRATION? 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Attracting international labour over the medium- to long-term is a crucial 
strategic issue for the European Union: demographic challenges, enhanced 
European global competitiveness, sustained European growth and the survival of 
welfare systems over the next decades, all depend on it.  
 However, EU labour migration policy has received very little attention from 
policy-makers, media and the public in general, even in the framework of the 
recent proposal for a European Migration Agenda.  
 The EU has no comprehensive set of policy instruments to cope with the 
international labour required by its labour markets.  
 There are several reasons to undertake the development of a more 
coherent and more comprehensive legal labour migration policy framework 
in the EU: 
- Non-economic migrants (family reunification, refugees and foreign students) 
amount to between two thirds and three quarters of all third-country nationals 
entering the EU labour market; 
- Labour migration policy is the only instrument allowing the selection of skilled 
migrants with the qualifications and skills required by the European labour markets; 
- Effective legal labour migration channels are a necessary component of any 
strategy to fight irregular labour migration; 
- Legal migration is a key component of international bilateral migration policy 
dialogues between the EU and its partner countries, in particular Mobility 
Partnership with Neighbourhood countries. A coherent EU labour migration policy 
framework is required to integrate this issue in policy dialogues.  
 An EU labour migration policy framework should be part of the emerging 
EU labour market and employment policy. 
 
There are signs of an impending demographic crisis in Europe. Beyond political debate, 
this emerges clearly from the consolidated demographic trends, both in terms of 
decreasing fertility and in terms of population aging (see Section 2.2). This is no doubt one 
of the key strategic questions for the future of Europe as a whole, its growth and well-
being: the growing divergence between the economic force of Europe and its demographic 
underpinnings. This points clearly to a need for international labour migration in the 
coming decades. But the mechanisms to organize international labour migration to the EU 
has received very little attention from policy-makers, the media and the public in general, 
even in the framework of the discussion of the European Agenda on Migration (reviewed in 
Section 5). When it does receive attention, it is all too often in relation to negative public 
attitudes towards migration or biased political debates about the assimilation of 
immigrants (analysed in Box 3 below). In contrast, the ongoing irregular migration crisis in 
the Mediterranean and the attempts at the EU level to cope with it (in terms of internal 
solidarity and distribution of responsibility) is attracting a great deal of attention. It is also 
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skewing the debate even further, as well as imposing a political focus on short-term 
responses to the detriment of more strategic medium- to long-term approaches.  
 
This notwithstanding, the reality is that the EU has not the policy tools in place to handle 
this issue over the medium term. The same applies, at national level, to many Member 
States. The need for an EU-wide labour migration system has long been discussed1. Since 
its appointment, the new European Commission, which began its time in office in 
November 2014, has shown itself determined to address this issue. President Juncker 
included, among his ten political priorities, “Towards a new Migration Policy” “to promote a 
new European policy on legal migration, in order to address specific skills shortages and 
better cope with demographic challenges, and as a first step, to review ‘Blue Card’ 
legislation and its unsatisfactory state of implementation”. Juncker also designated a 
Commissioner with special responsibilities for migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, and 
included this issue in his mandate2.  
 
Following up on this commitment, on 13 May 2015 the European Commission published its 
Communication on “A European Agenda on Migration” which tries to articulate a global 
response to migration and asylum challenges at the EU level3. The bulk of the Commission 
Communication is devoted to immediate action to face the migration crisis in the 
Mediterranean, fighting irregular migration and smugglers, border management and the 
development and implementation of a common asylum policy. But the Agenda also 
includes a pillar devoted to “A new policy on legal migration” with some action guidelines 
in this field (see Section 5). As such, it opens up a unique opportunity for a deep political 
and policy debate at the EU level on the future configuration and instruments of EU labour 
migration policy. This research paper intends to be a contribution to that debate based on 
existing research and policy-oriented analysis. 
 
In terms of labour migration, EU action is constrained by the current distribution of 
competences between EU institutions and Member States. According to article 79(5) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States have the 
exclusive competence of determining the volumes of admission of third-country nationals 
coming from third-countries in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed. 
 
But, as stated in the European Agenda on Migration, the EU has a specific role in this 
regard as well. Indeed, the reasons to undertake the development of a more coherent and 
more comprehensive legal labour migration policy in the EU are several: 
 
1. The EU labour market is slowly evolving from a constellation of 28 separate national 
labour markets into a single EU labour market: the 28 Member States remain 
segmented in terms of regulation of work conditions and salaries, largely due to the 
competences of Member State in this field, only complemented by the European Union 
according to article 2(1) of the TFEU. This single market is being driven by free 
movement of labour within the EU and EU-wide employment policy frameworks: in 
particular the European Employment Strategy (ESS) and its different policy 
                                          
1 For instance, a Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration was published back in 2005 to 
encourage discussion on this issue (COM(2004)811 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0811&from=EN).  
2 http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/avramopoulos-mission_en.pdf.  
3 Communication COM(2015)240 final, of 13.5.2015, from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, The European Economic and Social Council and the Committee of the Regions, A European Agenda on 
Migration,http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf.  
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instruments, as developed over the last years4. A political debate on the needs for 
common working conditions (for instance in relation to minimum wage) has already 
emerged in the last months. An EU-level labour migration policy is necessary in this 
framework. The policy should complement the EES by facilitating the access of 
international migrant workers to EU labour markets to fill the gaps in intra-EU labour 
and skills supply.  
 
2. To achieve that objective, any policy approach should fully integrate not only third-
country nationals entering the EU for employment purposes, but also those arriving for 
family, asylum, education or other purposes. The current narrow approach to EU 
labour migration means that the EU limits itself to regulating the flows of third-country 
national workers receiving work residence permits in the EU for employment. 
However, as seen in Figure 1, these first permits granted for employment reasons 
(around 500,000 a year for the whole EU in 2011-2013) are less than 20% of all 
residence permits. Family reunification permits amount to more than 650,000 a year, 
and other motives, mainly asylum, are increasing steadily to stand at almost 700,000 
in 2013. Over 450,000 third-country nationals get residence permits for study each 
year. However, a significant share of those immigrants entering the EU for non-work 
related reasons end up accessing the EU labour market in one way or another. 
Therefore, EU labour migration policies should not ignore these flows, amounting to 
between two thirds and three quarters of all third-country nationals entering the EU 
labour market. A specific policy should be developed to facilitate their smooth labour 
market integration, including a facilitation of migration status change once they are 
within the EU. For the same reasons, their number and qualification profile should be 
taken into account in the framework of labour migration policy planning, and more 
specifically in determining migrant labour needs in EU labour markets.  
 
Figure 1. First permits issued in the EU per reason and per year 
 
Source: Eurostat. Taken from European Commission (2015), Better Managing Labour migration  
at EU Level, Discussion paper nº 1, informal Expert Group on Economic Migration, DG Home. 
 
3. On the other hand, legal labour migration schemes are the only mechanism Europe 
has to select the qualifications profile of immigrants. It cannot do so either for: family 
reunification beneficiaries (who are entitled to come to Europe because of their family 
ties, not their qualifications); asylum beneficiaries (entitled because of persecution or 
conflict in their countries of origin, regardless of their skills and qualifications); or even 
                                          
4 With a series of EU-level instruments such as the EU Employment Guidelines, the Joint Employment Report, the 
2010 Agenda for New Skills and Jobs or the so-called “Employment Package” launched in April 2012, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101. 
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foreign students (self-selected by the investment it requires from them and their 
families). A key issue here is the assessment of the labour market impact of labour 
migration policies (see Section 4). As a general rule, the empirical research on 
migrants’ labour integration does not distinguish the results by channel of entrance 
(labour, family, study and humanitarian reasons): this is because of the disaggregated 
data available. As a consequence, the policy implications derived from these studies 
that recommend a more selective labour migration policy are flawed. They are based, 
after all, on labour force survey data referred to international migrants as a whole and 
not to those who entered the EU for the purposes of employment; in this way, the 
data used for assessing labour migration policies refer, in practice, to a migrant 
population where between 50% and 70% entered the EU for reasons other than 
employment. In any case, the qualification profile of third-country nationals entering 
the EU for other-than-employment purposes and the potential to enhance it (for 
instance through training and job counselling services) should be taken into 
consideration when designing EU-wide labour migration policies.  
 
4. Current legal migration channels are clearly insufficient to respond to the projected 
needs of the EU labour market and only cover some categories of potential labour 
migrants. Indeed, all assessments and projections in the EU labour market point to a 
significant need for a migrant labour force for the whole EU in the coming years and 
decades5. The lack of legal migration channels clearly encourages irregular migration, 
since the regularisation of irregular migrants remains the main way to access the EU 
labour market for reasons of employment. As a consequence, legal labour migration 
mechanisms into the EU are a necessary component of any strategy for fighting 
irregular migration.  
 
5. There are a set of international bilateral migration policy dialogues between the EU 
and countries of origin, such as the Mobility Partnerships (MPs) and the Common 
Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMM). But the EU will not be credible here if it 
does not implement them in a more balanced way across their four standard 
components: legal migration, the fight against irregular migration, migration and 
development and international protection. The Commission itself acknowledged in 
2014 that balance has been lacking, and among the lessons learnt of the 
implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) it pointed 
out that “more work needs to be done to make sure that the MPs are being 
implemented in a balanced manner, i.e. better reflecting all four thematic priorities of 
the GAMM, including more actions with regard to legal migration, human rights and 
refugee protection”6. In order to do so, Member States participating in those migration 
policy dialogues should engage themselves, in the framework of their exclusive 
competence in this field, to provide additional legal migration opportunities in that 
framework. But the offers by Member States should be integrated into a coherent EU 
labour migration policy framework. Such policy dialogues might also be instrumental 
in making a more efficient use of the family reunification strategy. This would perhaps 
include pre-departure language training and training in the occupations available in 
the destination countries for future reunified family members.  
 
                                          
5 All macro demographic studies, projecting a quick population decline and ageing in Europe, as well as sectorial 
and occupational labour market projections (such as Cedefop (2013), “Future Skills Supply and Demand in 
Europe: Forecast 2012”, Cedefop Research Paper nº 26), point to an increased need for foreign labour in the EU 
(for a review of all these projections, see EU-OECD (2014), ibid., chapters 1 and 9). 
6 See Communication from the Commission COM(2014)96 final, Report on the Implementation of the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility 2012-2013, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/ 
policies/international-affairs/general/docs/gamm_implementation_report_2012_2013_en.pdf.  
18 
This research paper starts from available evidence on the need for labour migration within 
the European Union over the short-, medium- and long-term, i.e. in relation to current job 
market vacancies and forecasts on future labour market needs.  
 
It then reviews the development of an EU-wide legal framework on economic migration 
and its status. The EU approach to legal labour migration has, to date, been very 
fragmented and limited. It has focused on specific categories of potential legal migrants: 
highly-qualified, intra-corporate transferees, seasonal workers and students and non-
remunerated trainees and researchers. 
 
The paper goes on by reviewing the existing research and evidence on the impact of EU 
migration policies on migration flows in the labour market, as well as the integration 
challenges posed by the arrival of third-country nationals. In this regard, the paper calls 
for a comprehensive labour market approach to EU labour migration reform, including not 
only economic migrants entering the EU labour market with a work permit, but also all 
third-country nationals ultimately accessing European labour markets. This includes, of 
course, family reunification beneficiaries, asylum-seekers and foreign students. 
 
Finally, the paper reviews a series of concrete policy options for widening the legal 
channels for access to the European labour market in response to identified labour market 
needs. Here it builds on the former work of the Migration Policy Centre (2015) and focuses 
on the legal, technical and political feasibility of each of the options analysed.  
 
However, these specific labour migration policy options are not sufficient to face the main 
challenges related to the development of an EU labour migration vision over the medium- 
to long-term. Here the relevant questions include the following: How to articulate intra-EU 
mobility and international migration to the EU labour market? How to make the EU labour 
market attractive for global talents as a migration destination? How to ensure that 
employers can tap workers from a sufficient pool of suitably qualified individuals (and that 
qualifications obtained abroad are recognized)? How to reduce international labour 
matching costs? And how to make EU- and Member States legal migration systems and 
competences compatible? 
 
At the same time, throughout this paper, we take into account public opinion and political 
sensitiveness around the issue of migration and migrant integration into European 
societies (see Box 3). The policy continuum and discontinuities (ranging from public 
opinion to political debate, then to policy analysis, to adopted legislation, to actual 
implementation and to measurable impact) is the context in which all proposed actions 
and legislation have to be framed.  
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2. LABOUR MARKET SHORTAGES AND LABOUR 
MIGRATION NEEDS IN THE EU: REVIEW OF THE 
EXISTING EVIDENCE 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Today, in most Member States’ labour markets high unemployment and 
underemployment levels coexist with substantial labour shortages as 
perceived by employers. 
 Whereas there is not an overall quantitative labour shortage for the whole EU, 
several studies find the existence of qualitative labour market shortages 
for specific skill levels/sectors/occupations. 
 The vast majority of shortages are, indeed, related to low skilled 
occupations. Specifically, occupation groups like metal, machinery and related 
trade workers, building and related trade workers, personal service workers and 
sales workers are the most needed.  
 Highly-skilled profiles are, instead, needed only in a limited number of 
occupations and countries, with significant difference among Member 
States. Overall, these findings confirm that, today, in the EU highly-skilled 
qualifications are needed only to a limited extent.  
 Accordingly, any strategy addressing labour needs in the EU – including 
highly-skilled migration schemes – should be geared to national labour 
markets’ needs and be strongly sector-oriented.  
 In terms of labour needs forecasts, for the period 2010-2020, supply and 
demand are roughly aligned for jobs requiring medium qualifications. Meanwhile, 
an oversupply of highly-skilled workers is expected resulting in a likely increase in 
overqualification rates. In contrast, the demand for jobs requiring low qualifications 
is expected to rise faster than the supply.  
 By looking together at different forecasts available, it can be stated that 
international migration is poised to play a major role in filling the EU’s 
labour market needs. Accordingly, redesigning pro-immigration policies should be 
a complementary response to current and future European labour supply dynamics.  
 Circular and temporary migration schemes can help deal with demographic 
and labour market challenges in Europe. However, permanent migration should 
be encouraged, as well, in order to maintain social cohesion and capitalize on 
migrant skills development and integration.  
 
Increasing knowledge about current and future labour market needs in the European 
Union and its Member States is crucial and lies at the heart of the EU’s Agenda for New 
Skills and Jobs: this was launched in 2010 as part of the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
Anticipating labour market shortages will, indeed, contribute both to assess future needs 
and to actively shape them (European Commission, 2010). In contemporary societies, not 
only quantitative labour shortages but also and especially qualitative labour shortages are 
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worth monitoring. Qualitative labour shortages may occur when employers are unable to 
find the required skills for a specific job or, conversely, because jobseekers with required 
skills do not want to fill a vacancy for low salaries, bad working conditions, scarce career 
perspectives, etc. These labour shortages can be observed at a skill, sector or occupation 
level. 
 
This section presents the core literature aiming at individuating labour market shortages at 
both the EU and – when data allow for it – at Member State (MS) level. Indeed, though 
there is some progress towards a single labour market in the EU, EU labour markets are 
still segmented in terms of regulations of work conditions and salaries (Martin and 
Venturini, 2015), as well as drivers of labour supply and demand. Consequently, they face 
different labour shortages in quantitative and qualitative terms. Existing studies differ in 
terms of geographical coverage (aggregate vs. national studies), time span (current 
estimates vs. forecasts), methodology (imbalances between labour supply and demand vs. 
employers’ surveys, etc.) and the shortage type (skill, sector, occupation). Here we will 
present their core findings. Specifically, we will first review those analyses focusing on 
current labour market shortages, followed by another set of studies which, instead, 
forecast future labour market shortages in the short to medium term. Emphasis will be put 
on skill, sector and occupational shortages while highlighting how international migration 
could help address labour imbalances. A synthetic comparative overview of all studies’ 
characteristics is reported in Box 1. 
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Box 1. Review of major studies aimed at assessing current (a) and future (b) labour market needs in the EU 
a. CURRENT NEEDS 
Source Type of shortages 
Geographical 
coverage 
Covered 
period 
Level of 
detail 
Method for 
measuring 
labour 
shortages 
Results 
Reymen et al., 
European Parliament, 
2015 
Quantitative 
shortages 
EU and EU 
MSs 2008-2014 All 
Imbalance 
between 
labour 
demand and 
supply (UV 
Beveridge 
Curve) 
At EU level: 
1. No evidence of quantitative labour shortages; 
2. The matching process of job-seekers with vacancies 
has become relatively less efficient after following the 
crisis; 
At EU MS level: 
1. A POSITIVE labour market outlook in AT, BE, DE, 
UK, with relatively tight labour markets.  
2. A NEGATIVE labour market outlook in EL and ES 
with very high unemployment with low vacancy rates 
(high job competition. 
Qualitative 
shortages 
EU and EU 
MSs 2000s Skill 
Qualification 
mismatch 
1. The highest incidence of over-qualification in EL, 
ES, LT, ES, PT, IE and IT; 
2. The highest incidence of under-qualification in FR, 
IE, BE, UK and FI 
Employer Company 
Survey  
(in Eurofound, 2015) 
Qualitative 
shortages 
28 EU MSs (+ 
IS, MK, ME, 
TK)  
2013 Skill Employers’ opinions 
39% of companies find difficulties in recruiting 
employees with the required skills, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (43%) 
Talent Shortage 
Survey  
(in ManpowerGroup, 
2015) 
Qualitative 
shortages 
19 EU MS (+ 
IS, SA, CH, 
TU, NO) 
2015 Skill Employers’ opinions 
38% of employers have difficulties in filling jobs due 
to lack of available talent 
European Business 
and Consumer Survey 
(on-line) 
Qualitative 
shortages 
EU and EU 
MSs 2003-2015 Sector 
Employers’ 
opinions 
Within all sectors, perceived shortages dropped 
consistently just after the crisis in 2009 to return at 
pre-crisis levels only in recent years (2014/2015) in 
the manufacturing and service sector.  
European Commission 
Study  
(in EC, 2014) 
Qualitative 
shortages 
EU MSs (+ IS, 
NO, LI) 2012-2014 Occupation 
 
Mixed method 
(employers’ 
surveys; 
imbalance 
indicators..) 
 
1. Identification of the top-twenty bottleneck 
occupations; 
2. The need of highly-skilled profiles differs greatly 
across EU MSs; 
(continues) 
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Box 1. Review of major studies aimed at assessing current (1a) and future (1b) labour market needs in the EU (cont.) 
b. FUTURE NEEDS 
Source Type of shortages 
Geographical 
coverage 
Covered 
period 
Level of 
detail 
Method for 
measuring 
labour 
shortages 
Results 
Cedefop  
(in Cedefop, 2012) 
Qualitative 
shortages 
EU MSs (+ 
NO, CH) 2010-2020 
Skill, 
occupation 
Forecasting 
methods 
1. Europe will be very unlikely to face difficulties in 
filling the demand for highly-educated workers; 
2. The most significant shortages are in low-skilled 
occupations; 
3. At medium-skilled level, demand and supply are 
roughly aligned; 
4. Large heterogeneity is observed across countries. 
Fargues and 
colleagues 
(in Fargues, 2014; 
Fargues and 
McCormick, 2013; 
Fargues, 2011) 
Quantitative 
shortages EU MSs 2010-2030 Occupation 
Two-scenario 
projections 
(with/without 
migration) 
1. Looking at shrinking dynamics: In case of no 
migration between 2010 and 2050, the EU27 would 
lose 87 million persons of working age (-27%). All 
Member States without exception would lose 
population at working age. If international migration 
would instead continue at pre-crisis levels, the loss 
would be reduced to -37 million or -12% (Fargues, 
2011); 
2. In terms of (skills) ageing dynamics, in the no-
migration scenario, the employed population aged 
over 45 years of age remains fairly consistent with an 
increase of less than 6%, while the population aged 
20-44 will decrease by over 16%; 
3. Large heterogeneity is observed across occupations 
and countries. 
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2.1. Assessing current labour market shortages 
 
According to existing assessments, there is no evidence in the EU of overall quantitative 
labour shortages defined as a “sustained market disequilibrium between supply and 
demand in which the quantity of workers demand exceeds the supply available and willing 
to work at a particular wage and working conditions at a particular place and point in time” 
(Reymen et al., 2015).  
 
However, in many EU Member States high unemployment and underemployment coexist 
with a high number of employers declaring difficulties in filling vacancies. For instance, the 
2013 Employer Company Survey and the 2015 Talent Shortage Survey found that four out 
of ten European companies found difficulties in recruiting employees with the required skills 
(Eurofound, 2015; ManpowerGroup, 2015), especially in the manufacturing sector (43%) 
(Eurofound, 2015). 
 
In other terms, qualitative labour market shortages and mismatches do exist despite the 
absence of overall quantitative shortages.  
 
Why does this happen? Employers often argue that young graduates have the wrong skills 
(Cedefop, 2014). However, several factors other than skill-deficits drive these trends. 
Among them, it is worth mentioning low labour mobility, seasonal shifts in demand, 
imperfect information about job opportunities, wage rigidities, unattractiveness of working 
conditions, and inefficient recruitment and training strategies. All these factors affect labour 
market dynamics in an heterogeneous manner according to skill, sector and occupation. 
Accordingly, we will discuss below the magnitude and the characteristics of current 
qualitative labour market shortages.  
 
To what extent do qualitative shortages affect European labour markets? Which are the 
skills, sectors and occupations that are most concerned? In terms of skills, firms continue 
to report difficulties finding the right skills and thus stress skill shortages7 in today’s labour 
markets (Eurofound, 2015). However, as highlighted by Cedefop (2014), this argument 
seems not fully convincing. Weak labour market demand and high unemployment is 
creating other types of more notable skill mismatches, particularly overqualification.  
 
In the EU, in 2011, around 29% of highly-qualified workers were in jobs requiring low- to 
medium qualification levels (Labour Force Survey data in Cedefop, 2014). At a MS level, in 
the 2001-2011 period, the highest incidence of over-qualification was observed in Greece 
(26%), Lithuania (23%), Spain (22%), Portugal (21%), Ireland (21%) and Italy (21%) 
(Reymen et al., 2015). 
 
Even if imbalances between supply and demand by skills are inevitable in imperfect labour 
markets, widespread labour overqualification challenges European economic goals. At a macro-
economic level, these dynamics strongly contribute to structural unemployment and reduce 
GDP growth through workforce underutilization and productivity reduction (WEF, 2014).  
 
Even when a workforce with the appropriate skills is available, shortages can occur at the 
sectoral level (Reymen et al., 2015). In the EU, “perceived” sector shortages can be inferred 
from the Eurostat Business and Consumer Survey. This survey asks managerial staff of EU 
                                          
7 Skill shortages occur “when employers are unable to recruit staff with the required skills in the accessible labour 
market and at the on-going rate of pay” (Quintini, 2011). 
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companies to assess the main factors limiting their production, including labour shortages. In 
the 2003-2015 period, the highest perceived labour shortages were observed in the 
construction sector, though cross-country differentials varied over time. Within all sectors, 
shortages dropped consistently just after the crisis in 2009 to return to pre-crisis levels in the 
manufacturing and service sector only in recent years (2014/2015) (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Perceived labour shortages by employers in the EU, 2003q2-2015q2, % values 
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Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of 2015 Eurostat Business and Consumer Survey. 
 
There are some EU countries where labour shortages are, instead, observed within the 
crisis period, namely Germany (construction and service sectors), the UK (industrial sector) 
and a few others. 
 
Finally, a greater level of detail can be detected when looking at occupational shortages, 
which are broadly identified as occupations for which it is “difficult to fill vacancies” (EC, 
2012). A recent project carried out by the European Commission – using the European 
Vacancy Monitor in combination with national data – focuses on the so-called bottleneck 
occupations: these occur when employers have problems in recruiting staff for specific 
occupations and/or it takes a long time for these occupations to be filled. Table 1 shows the 
top 20 bottleneck occupations (ISCO 2 and 4 digit) as identified by the study.  
 
Table 1. Top 20 bottleneck occupations (ISCO-2 and ISCO-4 level) in the EU (a) 
Bottleneck vacancies at ISCO-2 and ISCO-4 levels 
N.of bottleneck 
vacancies 
reported 
N. of countries 
with 
bottlenecks (*) 
Reasons for 
shortages 
72. Metal, Machinery and related trades workers 53 
23 (AT, FR, 
IT, LV, UK) 
Scarce job 
attractiveness 7212. Welders and flamecutters 10 
7223. Metal working machine tool setters and operators 9 
21. Science and engineering professionals 48 
22 (SE, DK, 
BE, AT, SK) Lack of skills 
2144. Mechanical engineers 9 
2151. Electrical engineers 8 
2142. Civil engineers 6 
25. Information and communications technology 
professionals 47 
20 (BE, DK, 
IT, LV, SE) 
Lack of skills 
2512. Software developers 9   
2511. System analysts 7   
22. Health professionals 45 21 (CZ, FI, FR) 
Scarce labour 
mobility 2221. Nursing professionals 10   
2212. Specialist medical practitioners 10   
(continues) 
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Table 1. Top 20 bottleneck occupations (ISCO-2 and ISCO-4 level) in the EU (a) (cont.) 
Bottleneck vacancies at ISCO-2 and ISCO-4 levels 
Number of 
bottleneck 
vacancies 
reported 
N. of countries 
with 
bottlenecks (*) 
Reasons for 
shortages 
71. Building and related trades workers, excluding 
electricians 41 
18 (AT, IT, 
PO, PT, RO) 
Scarce job 
attractiveness 7115. Carpenters and joiners 11   
7126. Plumbers and pipe fitters 8   
51. Personal service workers 32 
22 (CR, CY, 
HU, LV, PO, 
SK) 
Scarce job 
attractiveness 5120. Cooks 17 
5131. Waiters 7 
31. Science and engineering associate professionals 29 14 (AT, BE, SE, UK) Lack of skills 
52. Sales workers 14 
13 (DK, FI, 
HU, IT, PO, 
UK) 
Scarce job 
attractiveness 
5223. Shop sales assistants 6   
83. Drivers and mobile plant operators 21 16 (PO, CZ, HU, LV) Scarce job 
attractiveness 8332. Heavy truck and lorry drivers 8   
75. Food processing, wood working, garment and 
other craft and related workers 20 
12 (HU, LV, 
RO, CR) 
Scarce job 
attractiveness 
23. Teaching professionals 17 12 n.a. 
2341. Primary school teachers 6   n.a. 
33. Business and administration associate 
professionals 15 13 n.a. 
3322. Commercial sales representatives 6   n.a. 
24. Business and administration professionals 17 11 n.a. 
2411. Accountants 7   n.a. 
74. Electrical and electronic trades workers 15 12 n.a. 
7411. Building and related electricians 6   n.a. 
81. Stationary plant and machine operators 13 9 n.a. 
91. Cleaners and helpers 8 8 n.a. 
96. Refuse workers and other elementary workers 6 5 n.a. 
53. Personal care workers 9 6 n.a. 
5321. Health care assistants 3   n.a. 
12. Administrative and commercial managers 11 6 n.a. 
92. Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers 5 3 n.a. 
(a) Occupations are ranked by ISCO-2 level. The highest the ranking position the more difficult to fill vacancies. 
Ranking criteria are various, namely the number of bottleneck occupations and countries and the position they cover 
at a country level (i.e. whether they are in the top-5 or top-20 position). For more details, see EC, 2014. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on EC, 2014 and Kalantaryan and Martin, 2015. 
 
Overall, only eight occupation groups (ISCO-2) and ten occupations (ISCO-4) out of twenty 
require highly-skilled qualifications (highlighted in grey). Among them, the highest ranks 
are related to three broad groups: science and engineering; information and 
communications technology; and health professionals. In terms of occupations, mechanical, 
electrical and civil engineers as well as software developers and system analysts, nursing 
professional and specialist medical practitioners are the most requested careers. 
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The vast majority of shortages are, instead, related to low skilled occupations. Specifically, 
occupation groups like metal, machinery and related trade workers, building and related 
trade workers, personal service workers and sales workers are the most needed.8  
 
At a disaggregate level, highly-skilled profiles are critically needed only in some Northern 
(Sweden, Denmark) and Western (Austria, Belgium and Germany) MSs, where graduate 
unemployment is almost frictional at around 4% (Kalantaryan and Martin, 2015). The need 
for both high and low skilled qualifications coexists, instead, in countries such as France 
and the UK, while in Southern European countries (e.g. Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, where 
graduate unemployment exceeds 8%) and some Eastern MSs (such as Romania, Poland, 
Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Croatia) low and medium skilled profiles are more in 
demand. 
 
Overall, these findings confirm that, today, in the EU highly-skilled qualifications are 
needed only to a limited extent. Among them, only specific occupations are requested, with 
significant differences between MS. Accordingly, any strategy addressing labour needs in 
the EU – including highly-skilled migration schemes – have necessarily to be geared to 
national labour markets’ needs and to be strongly sector-oriented. 
 
2.2. What about the future? Can international migration play a 
role? 
 
Significant labour market imbalances are expected to persist in the coming decades, as 
showed by the forecasts elaborated by the European Centre for Development and 
Vocational Training (Cedefop). Cedefop provides the European Commission with forecasts 
on trends in skills supply and demand for Europe on a two-year basis. Being based on time-
series analysis, imbalances between the supply of people’s skills – measured by their 
formal qualification level – and demand for skills – measured by the typical qualifications 
needed for various occupations – indicate the situation as it “will evolve if current trends in 
sectors, occupations and qualification levels continue”. 
 
According to 2012 Cedefop forecasts9, in the period 2010-2020 supply-demand10 matching 
trends will differ by skills. First, supply and demand are roughly aligned for jobs requiring 
medium qualifications. This labour market segment – which is by far the largest one in the 
market – will thus be in a balanced situation. Opposite trends will, instead, be observed for 
occupations requiring high and low skills. The most critical situation concerns jobs requiring 
high qualifications. Here, the supply is expected to grow faster than demand. The main 
reason is to be found in the fact that the scarcity of job opportunities has pushed more 
young people to stay in education or training. Thus, an oversupply of highly-skilled persons 
is likely to occur, resulting in a likely increase in over-qualification dynamics. On the 
contrary, the demand for jobs requiring low qualifications is expected to rise faster than 
supply. Though not severe, specific shortages may be observed in this labour market 
segment (Cedefop, 2012). 
 
                                          
8 On identified shortage occupations in Member States, see EMN 2015b, and in particular its Annex 4 (Top 15 
Professionals included in lists of shortage occupations by country).  
9 2014 Cedefop forecasts – published in June 2015 – are not presented here because they do not contain specific 
information on shortages. Though they contain forecasts about future supply and demand trends, no interplay 
between the two (matching supply and demand) has yet been presented. 
10 Supply is measured by the labour force while the demand trend is measured by employment. 
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An heterogeneous situation is observed, though, at a sector and country level. So, Figure 3 
captures labour shortages by the Indicator of Future Imbalances of the Demand (IFIOD)11 
indicator. 
 
Figure 3. IFIOD values by sector (a) and country (b), EU27, Norway and Switzerland, 2010-
2020 
(a)       (b) 
 
Source: Cedefop, 2012. 
 
 
Figure 3a clearly confirms that Europe will be very unlikely to face difficulties in filling the 
demand for highly-educated workers. In contrast, the most significant shortages are in 
occupations at the lower end of ISCO, namely agricultural, fishery and related labourers, 
sales, services and elementary occupations, labourers in mining, etc. This is likely to result 
in increased competition for low skilled occupations and, consequently, higher over-
qualification rates together with increasing risks of crowding-out job dynamics of lower-
skilled people by highly-skilled ones.  
 
The problematic labour market insertion of highly-skilled people is thus confirmed. Not 
surprisingly, the largest difficulties in recruiting the appropriate skill mix will be felt in 
countries characterized by high shares of highly-skilled workers (Finland and Norway); as 
well as in countries supporting education pathways for young people to compensate for lack 
of opportunities such as Lithuania, Hungary and Romania (Figure 3b) (Cedefop, 2012). 
 
                                          
11 The IFIOD indicator summarizes the overall supply-demand relationship of qualification levels. The closer the 
indicator is to one, the lower the difficulties in recruiting the appropriate skill mix (for further details, see Cedefop, 
2012). 
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In line with its results, Cedefop’s core recommendation is to invest in the creation of skills-
intensive jobs that will efficiently utilize the rich set of skills possessed by the European 
workforce and will not allow them to become obsolete (Cedefop, 2012). Certainly, cross-
country differences must be taken into account in this regard. 
 
Despite their relevance, Cedefop’s forecasts have three main limitations: 
  
1. They do not provide any information about the field of study, while it is known 
that skill mismatches are often about the lack of “right skills” and the mismatch 
between what people study and the disciplines required by the labour market; 
2. results on shortages at a MS level are scarcely available; 
3. there is no mention of the role which international migration (i.e. the variable 
country of birth/country of citizenship) may play over the short/medium term. 
 
In recent times, points 2 and 3 have been addressed by Fargues and his colleagues in a 
number of studies12. They have shown the role of migration on population dynamics by 
showing two population scenarios which, in turn, include and exclude international 
migration flows.13 Complementarily, working age population (or workforce) trends are not 
only analysed in terms of shrinking but also of ageing dynamics. Indeed, while the decline 
of the EU’s workforce certainly undermines the EU’s production and wealth (Fargues, 
2011), its ageing poses other severe challenges. With the gradual shift from younger to 
older manpower, there has been an elevation of the average duration of time elapsed since 
the termination of formal education. This translates into outdated knowledge among the 
labour supply. A reduction in the number of young working people has resulted in a parallel 
reduction in the mass of recently acquired education, formal knowledge, and skills in the 
fields where up-to-date knowledge matters more than experience. This is also likely to 
affect labour force productivity and its potential to innovate. Fargues and McCormick refer, 
in fact, to the “ageing of skills” (Fargues and McCormick, 2013). 
 
Looking at shrinking dynamics, Fargues found that if no migration was to take place 
between 2010 and 2050, the EU27 would lose 87 million persons of working age (-27%). 
All Member States without exception would lose population at working age. If international 
migration would instead continue at pre-crisis levels, the loss would be reduced to -37 
million or -12% (Fargues, 2011). Together with other policies, migration thus largely 
contributes to the working age population’s absolute decline. Of specific interest for this 
review, Fargues and McCormick (2013) developed medium term projections restricted to 
the employed population by occupation and age. Accordingly, in the no-migration scenario, 
between 2010 and 2025, the employed population will decrease from 220 to 204 million, 
i.e. -7.4% of its initial value in 201014. 
 
In terms of (skills) ageing dynamics, in the no-migration scenario, the employed population 
aged over 45 years of age would remain fairly consistent with an increase of less than 6%: 
while the population aged 20-44 will decrease by over 16% (Figure 3) in the no-migration 
scenario. 
 
                                          
12 See e.g. Fargues, 2014; Fargues and McCormick, 2013; Fargues, 2011. 
13 Other notable studies looking at the impact of international migration on population and skill dynamics are 
OECD, 2014 and OECD, 2011. 
14 Here, it is assumed that the rate of economic participation remains unchanged across the projected period. 
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Figure 4. Projection of the EU27 labour force by broad age group. 2010-2025. No migration 
scenario  
 
Source: Fargues, 2011. 
 
However, not all occupations in the EU will see a sizeable decline (Figure 5.a) and ageing 
process (Figure 5.b).  
 
Figure 5. Projections of the employed population by age and occupation. 2010-2025. No 
migration scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fargues and McCormick, 2013. 
 
 
Groups of occupations such as legislators, elementary and agricultural workers will face the 
most critical population shrinking and ageing of skills. The impact upon the future 
productive capacity of each industry that these occupations provide labour for will clearly 
be significant and undesirable (Fargues, 2011). By looking together at Cedefop and 
Fargues’ results, we can certainly say that international migration is poised to play a major 
role here. 
 
As already noted, these dynamics differ largely according to EU MS, as showed by the 
cases of France, Germany and Spain. Whereas France (Figure 6c) has a more positive 
demographic picture, with the population aged below 45 remaining higher than the 
workforce aged 45 and over, Spain on the other hand (Figure 6b) has a more dramatic 
trajectory, with the two age groups almost being equal by the end of the projection period 
(2025). Germany’s trends (Figure 6a) are instead similar to the overall EU27 average. 
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Figure 6. Projection of the labour force by broad age group, Germany, Spain and France. 
2010-2025. No migration scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fargues and McCormick, 2013. 
 
Although the demographic momentum in each country will see a reduction in their 
respective populations, the impact will be felt much more in Spain than in France, 
especially in terms of the ageing of skills. When looking at specific occupations, Figure 7a 
shows that there will be an increased supply of engineers aged below 45. Health 
professionals are another occupation that requires high levels of education. However, 
France is the only country projected to have an increased supply of people aged below 45 
in 2025, with Germany having a very small reduction, whilst Spain is likely to experience a 
significant decline in supply (Figure 7b). In more elementary occupations, the demographic 
effects of ageing are also clear. For example, in Figure 7c reductions are experienced in all 
three countries. However France continues to have the highest relative share of stationary 
plant and related operators. The impact of skills’ ageing and workforce shrinking is, 
therefore, diverse across EU states. 
 
Figure 7. Projection of selected occupations among persons below 45 years. Germany, 
Spain and France. 2010-2025. No migration scenario  
 
Source: Fargues and McCormick, 2013. 
 
In line with these findings, Fargues (2014) concludes that redesigning pro-immigration 
policies would be a complementary response to current and future European labour supply 
dynamics.  
 
Together with other policies, a major solution would be encouraging temporary and circular 
migration which is both useful for filling labour shortages and for maintaining a sustainable 
demographic situation. Indeed, while permanent migrants are subject to the same ageing 
process as natives – implying a continuous rising number of migrants to compensate for 
retiring natives –, temporary migrants will return to their country of origin before or at 
retirement. In so doing, it increases the size of the population at working age but not (or 
only by a small margin) at young and old ages (Fargues, 2011).  
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However, encouraging only temporary or circular migration is seen as problematic by these 
authors. Very high percentages of temporary migrants – necessary for curbing 
demographic trends – are considered to be socially and politically unsustainable. Temporary 
migration brings non-citizens with no prospect for, or no interest in, acceding to citizenship. 
They have only limited membership in the host society and share very little with its 
members. They can only constitute a small minority of the population, unless one regards 
the segmented societies built in the oil states of the Gulf as a model for Europe. 
Accordingly, Fargues (2011) strongly recommends that “former policies favouring 
settlement through family reunification should not be abandoned, but should coexist with 
those favouring the circulation and return of migrants”. 
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3. A BRIEF CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR LABOUR MIGRATION AT THE EU 
LEVEL  
KEY FINDINGS 
 After an attempt in 2001 to adopt a comprehensive approach to economic migration 
to the EU, EU legislation has opted for a “category-by-category” approach. 
To date this has focused on students, researchers, highly-qualified 
migrants, seasonal workers and intra-corporate transferees: there is also a 
proposal amending the 2004 Students Directive and the 2005 Researchers Directive 
that has not yet been adopted.  
 According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European union, Member 
States continue to determine the numbers of third-country nationals seeking 
work, whether employed or self-employed. This rules out the possibility of EU 
quotas for migrant workers, and, in fact, the idea has never been raised.  
 Beneficiaries of family reunification and international protection, as well as 
foreign students, can also access Member State labour markets under certain 
specific conditions. Member States have some discretionary powers in this regard. 
 Assessments of the implementation of the Researchers Directive (2011) 
and the Blue Card Directive on highly-qualified migrants (2014) show low 
rates of use. In both cases, as with the Seasonal Workers Directive, the wide 
power of discretion retained by Member States undermines the potential of 
directives. 
 Beyond the very conditions of admission, intra-EU mobility of third-country 
nationals remains a key component of EU labour migration policy and one 
of the biggest failures in European immigration policy. 
 Overall, the EU labour migration system lacks effective coordination 
mechanisms between Member States for policy implementation at the EU level. 
 
The allocation of labour migration competences between the Union and its Member States 
remains a sensitive political issue. While the Amsterdam Treaty envisaged the progressive 
“supranationalisation” of the immigration and asylum policies, it is only the Lisbon Treaty 
that finalised this process for legal migration. Since then, the relevant decision-making 
process has been subject to ordinary legislative procedure, as enshrined in Article 79(2) 
TFEU. It, therefore, requires qualified majority voting in the Council together with a co-
decision from the European Parliament. However, Member States could only accept this 
change by obtaining a reserve of competence negotiated during the Convention that 
prepared the European Constitution: following article 79(5) TFEU, Member States remain 
competent to determine the volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from 
third-countries in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed. This prevents 
the adoption of migrant worker quotas at the EU level, and, in fact, the idea has never 
been raised. In practical terms, as we will see below, even in areas subject to EU directives, 
significant differences in Member State legislative systems remain and many aspects of 
labour migration are still left to the discretion of the Member States. 
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Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the regulation of labour 
migration has become a major issue, leading to a significant increase in legislative 
measures over the last years. Following the conclusions of the European Council of 
Tampere, the Commission presented, in 2001, its first proposal aimed at defining the 
conditions of entry and residence for third-country nationals (TCNs) coming for the purpose 
of paid employment and self-employment.  
 
The Commission canvassed for a comprehensive approach regulating conditions 
independently of workers’ qualifications. However, as it faced strong opposition from most 
Member States, the proposal was finally withdrawn. After this failure, the Commission 
organised, in 2005, a public consultation on the basis of the Green paper on “An EU 
approach to managing economic migration”.15 Notwithstanding concerns expressed by the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, the Commission 
changed its strategy and opted for a “category-by-category” (not to be confused with a 
“sectoral”) approach, instead of horizontally covering all TCNs entering EU territory for 
economic purposes. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the adoption in 2005 of the 
Researchers Directive marked a turning point16. For the first time, an innovative 
mechanism allowed specifically selected research organizations to conclude hosting 
agreements with TCN researchers coming to carry out a research project in the European 
Community for more than three months. Entry, residence and mobility were facilitated for 
this category, and a work permit was no longer required.  
 
Addressing the need to develop common rules in the field of labour migration, the 
Commission presented in 2005 a new Policy Plan on Legal Migration. It listed a range of 
legislative measures in order to better manage labour migration at the EU level17. There 
were some general points including a general framework directive intended to guarantee 
TCN rights in legal employment and a single application procedure for a joint work and 
residence permit. However, all the other instruments that have been adopted break down 
according to the category of third-country workers concerned: first, a Blue Card Directive 
designed to attract highly-qualified workers from third-countries to the European Union; 
second, a directive on seasonal workers; and, third, a directive on Intra-corporate 
transferees (ICTs); while the idea of a fourth instrument for remunerated trainees 
expressed in the policy plan has been abandoned. 
 
Workers, however, are not the only third-country nationals to access the labour market of 
EU Member States. Migrants initially admitted for non-economic purposes (thus entering 
through different legal immigration channels), also have access to employment or self-
employment, either immediately after their admission or after a certain waiting period. In 
particular, family members of third-country nationals are entitled, in the same way as the 
person they are joining, to (self)-employment. The host Member State does, though, keep 
a margin of appreciation and may impose some conditions and restrictions on access18. 
Indeed, according to the Commission’s last report adopted on the application of Directive 
2003/86/EC in 200819, most Member States require a work permit or make access 
conditional on a labour market test during the first twelve months. That being said, the 
transposition of the directive into Member State legislation usually gives admitted family 
                                          
15 EC, Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration, 11 January 2005, COM(2004)811. 
16 Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals 
for the purposes of scientific research. 
17 EC, Policy Plan on Legal Migration, 21 December 2005, COM(2005)669 final. 
18 Article 14 of Directive 2003/86/EC. 
19 EC, Report on the application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, COM(2008)610 final, 
p. 13. 
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members easier access to employment. In its 2014 guidance to Member States on how to 
apply Directive 2003/86, the Commission stressed the need to keep restrictions on labour 
market access for family members to a minimum. The Commission particularly argued for 
access for migrant women20.  
 
Beneficiaries of international protection can also engage in employed or self-employed 
activities immediately after the protection status has been granted21: they are, though, 
subject to rules generally applicable to regulated professions and to public administration. 
For both refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, the Commission reported that 
the vast majority of Member States authorise access to the labour market: only three 
Member States apply the limitation allowed by the Directive22. Additionally, asylum seekers 
cannot be denied access to the labour market and vocational training, once six months 
have passed since lodging their application. In this last case, however, Member States have 
a great degree of control of their internal labour market and can decide, for instance, the 
kind of work asylum applicants may apply for; or the time they are allowed to work per 
month or per year23. 
 
While initially entering the EU for studies, students are also entitled to (self) employment 
under certain conditions24. In this regard, the CJEU has ruled that a labour market 
preference test applied by Member States for students was not compatible with Directive 
2004/11425. According to the 2012 EMN Synthesis report on the immigration of 
international students to the EU26, over two million first residence permits were issued in 
2011 to third-country nationals and 21% of these were for education. Approximately 
190,000 were issued for study purposes, as per the Students Directive 2004/114.  
 
Finally, third-country nationals who have acquired long-term resident (LTR) status in their 
host Member State enjoy, after five years of stay, equal treatment with nationals, as 
regards access to paid and unpaid employment, without prejudice of possible national 
restrictions and additional requirements (e.g. proof of appropriate language proficiency)27. 
In 2011, the Commission reported that the legislation in seventeen Member States included 
a restriction or excluded LTR’s from activities involving the exercise of public authority. A 
few countries, meanwhile, applied restrictions on access to employment after the first 
twelve months in breach of the Directive28. 
 
From a statistical point of view, the majority of TCNs accessing Member State labour 
markets enter the country for non-economic purposes (see Figure 1 in Section 1). Whereas 
such figures are welcome in terms of integration and employment rates, they also underline 
the need to better deal with the current labour migration policy by developing a consistent 
and comprehensive strategy in this field. Undeniably, the ability to assess the volume of 
workers needed in labour markets and to target the wide diversity of working migrants’ 
profiles is challenging. Apart from legislative harmonisation, this means enhancing 
                                          
20 EC, Communication on guidance for application of Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, 
COM(2014) 210 final. 
21 Article 26 of Directive 2004/83 (Qualification). 
22 EC, Report on the application of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise in 
need of international protection and the content of the protection, COM(2010) 314 final. 
23 Article 11 and 12 of Directive 2003/9 (Reception). 
24 Article 17 of Directive 2004/114 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service. 
25 CJEU, C-15/11, Sommer, 21 June 2012. 
26 EMN, Synthesis report on Immigration of International Students to the EU, 2012. 
27 Article 11 of Directive 2003/109. 
28 EC, Report from the Commission on the application of Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents, COM(2011)585 final. 
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coordination between Member States when implementing these instruments, as a step 
towards the achievement of a common immigration policy.  
3.1. A critical overview of the EU legal framework for labour 
migration 
 
In December 2011, the European Commission issued a report assessing the impact of 
Directive 2005/71 on attracting third-country researchers to the EU29. Results were rather 
disappointing: in 2010, only 6,945 researchers were admitted under this scheme (most 
from India, China, the United States, Russia and Japan), while, in order to meet the Europe 
2020 target of increasing R&D investment to 3% of GDP, one million additional researchers 
would be needed. According to the Commission, this failure might be explained, inter alia, 
by the ineffective promotion of the Directive and differentiation between permits for 
researchers and other types of permits for highly-skilled workers. Worldwide promotion for 
this ambitious scheme for migrant researchers is certainly needed. 
 
The Blue Card Directive was the first legal instrument to be adopted among the key 
proposals of the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration.30 In the same vein as Directive 
2005/71, the Blue Card was designed to attract highly-qualified third-country workers, 
foster economic competitiveness and achieve the Lisbon strategy objectives. The Blue Card 
Directive establishes a more or less fast-track admission procedure (90 days), but Member 
States remain free to limit access to their labour market (restrictions on some professions, 
sectors or regions). Moreover, during the first two years, Blue Card holders are restricted to 
the exercise of paid employment activities for which the permit has been granted; 
afterwards, Member States may grant them equal treatment to nationals as regards access 
to highly-qualified employment. According to the Commission’s last report, the Blue Card 
Directive has made little impact on achieving its intended objectives. In 2012, only 3,664 
Blue Cards were given out, which increased in 2013 to 15,261. Most have been issued by 
Germany (14,197), Luxembourg and France (respectively 306 and 304), and the main 
beneficiary countries were India, China, Russia, the United States and Ukraine. As regards 
implementation, the Commission expressed its concern “about flaws in transposition” and 
“the limited set of rights and barriers to intra-EU mobility”31, likely to dissuade highly-
skilled migrants to come to the EU through the scheme. In this regard, the practice of dual 
schemes for attracting highly-skilled workers (a national scheme more favourable than the 
Blue Card being implemented) is quite problematic. This kind of a competing system might 
lead to the experience of the Netherlands. There a single Blue Card was issued whilst 6,000 
to 7,000 Dutch “knowledge worker” residence permits were delivered on the basis of 
national law, from 2010 to 2012 (Groenendijk 2014, p. 94). That being said, the directive 
allows greater flexibility for legally resident third-country nationals wishing to shift from a 
national permit to the European one, by explicitly providing them with the possibility of 
applying for an EU Blue Card inside the territory of the Member State concerned.32 
 
With the Seasonal Workers Directive, EU immigration labour legislation has been extended, 
for the first time, to medium and low-skilled TCNs workers33. There are not, as yet, 
                                          
29 EC report on the application of Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-country 
nationals for the purposes of scientific research, 20 December 2011. 
30 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
31 EC, Report on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (“EU Blue Card”), Com(2014) 287 final. 
32 Article 10(2) of the Blue Card Directive. 
33 Council Directive 2014/36 on the conditions of the entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers. 
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comprehensive and comparable data available on TCNs seasonal workers in the EU. 
However, according to the Commission’s estimates, more than 100,000 third-country 
seasonal workers arrive in the EU each year (including irregular migrants). Some Member 
States are particularly popular: Spain (24,838 non-EU seasonal workers in 2008 alone); 
Italy (over 11,000 applications received in mid-February 2008); Germany (4,248 admitted 
in 2009), France and Sweden34. According to the Directive, a seasonal work permit entitles 
its holder to stay and work in the territory of a Member State for a stay exceeding 90 days: 
EU visa legislation applies for shorter periods of stay. This Directive, providing for new rules 
on working conditions for potentially vulnerable workers, intends not only to prevent 
exploitation and abuse from employers but also to enhance the EU’s economic 
competitiveness, especially in sectors characterised by the strong presence of seasonal 
workers: namely, agriculture, horticulture and tourism.  
 
The deadline for transposition has been set for September 2016. It would, then, be 
obviously premature to assess the concrete impact of this Directive. However, Member 
States keep here again a wide margin of discretion, notably as regards: equal treatment 
with nationals; the right to change employer; and the level of right guaranteed compared 
to the framework directive (see below). In addition, some authors identified potential risks 
of “misuse” in case a more extensive interpretation would be given to “seasonal work”. 
Indeed, due to the lack of binding rules on circular and temporary employment in the 
current EU legal framework and the Member States’ discretion in providing seasonal 
workers with a more stable residence permit, Directive 2014/36 could have quite different 
outcomes. It might become an indirect channel for temporary employment (while providing 
a rather low level of rights) or allow the “eternal employment” of seasonal workers, 
excluded from the personal scope of the LTR Directive (Groenendijk 2014, p. 95). More 
fundamentally, one might wonder whether this Directive will offer a real breakthrough 
opening the way to more EU labour migration policy. 
 
The third component of the package of measures presented in the 2005 Plan, the Intra-
Corporate Transferees Directive was adopted on 15 May 201435. Its objective is to facilitate 
the intra-corporate transfers of managers, specialists and trainees to the EU by setting up 
transparent and harmonised conditions for admission, residence, work and mobility. In 
several respects, the ICT directive is quite innovative: it covers a new category of TCN 
workers and it lays down a common set of rights for intra-corporate transferees in order to 
avoid their exploitation or the distortion of competition. Most importantly, it creates a new 
intra-EU mobility scheme, based on mutual recognition between Member States rather than 
harmonisation. The ICT permit is the first permit allowing its holders to work in several 
Member States for entities belonging to the same group of undertakings. However, the 
Directive distinguishes between short-term (fewer than 90 days in any 180 day period) and 
long-term (more than 90 days) intra-mobility: the conditions of the latter are stricter. 
Indubitably, Directive 2014/66 represents an interesting step towards further coordination 
between Member States. It remains to be seen, however, whether they can reach a 
sufficient level of mutual trust in order to ensure its effective implementation.  
 
Finally, a last “remnant” of the transversal approach, Directive 2011/98 (Framework 
Directive) was adopted to provide a common set of rights for all TCNs. Besides a single 
procedure establishing a unique permit for work and residence, the Directive defines a 
                                          
34 EC, Staff Working Document, Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purpose of seasonal employment, ST 12208 2010 ADD 2. 
35 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer. 
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common set of rights for all non-EU migrants at work. Note that these rights apply whether 
they have just arrived or whether they are already resident in a Member State. It, 
however, excludes from its scope several categories of migrants, either because they are 
already covered by EU legislation or due to the temporary nature of their status (e.g. 
seasonal workers). The establishment of a single application procedure marks an 
undeniable simplification. However, Member States are still given great leeway at different 
stages of the application procedure and there is little harmonisation regarding procedural 
guarantees. The same conclusions can be drawn as regards the areas in which equal rights 
are granted, subject to potential restrictions from Member States36.  
 
Beyond the conditions of admission, intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals remains a 
key component of the EU labour migration policy and one of the biggest failures in 
European immigration policy to date. Mobility schemes still vary according to categories of 
migrants covered by EU directives and are largely left to Member States’ discretion. While 
the EU acquis recognises economic and social benefits resulting from mobility for both 
Member States and individuals (reducing skills mismatches, addressing unemployment, 
supporting growth at the EU level etc.),37 barriers continue to exist, both in the EU acquis 
and in measures applied by Member States. As pointed out in EMN 2013, Blue Card holders 
and their family members may move, for the purpose of highly-qualified employment, after 
eighteen months of legal residence in one MS. But they still need to apply for a second Blue 
Card. All the conditions set out in Article 5 of the Directive 2009/50 are reassessed by the 
second MS, allowing discretion and scope for variation, not least as regards labour market 
testing. While not necessarily falling within the scope of labour migration, the LTR Directive 
requires also a second application for a residence permit, when the recognised LTR decides 
to move to another MS. Here again, national authorities are allowed to apply additional 
measures, including the application of a labour market test or even compliance with 
integration measures. Additionally, national measures adopted at MS level are also likely to 
influence the intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals and sometimes dissuade them 
from moving for the purpose of employment. Such “negative” measures might include 
burdensome administrative requirements, lack of automatic recognition of degrees and 
diplomas, and rates of minimum wages required. 
 
While there is no doubt that Europe would greatly benefit economically from greater intra-
EU mobility in order to be more attractive and competitive, more legislative harmonisation 
appears unrealistic in the current situation characterised by the absence of a single 
European labour market and by the limitations of European employment policy, reduced to 
a kind of open method of coordination (see Section 3.2 below). In this regard, the 2014 
Political Guidelines for the next European Commission continue to show little interaction 
between Employment and Legal migration policies; despite promoting labour mobility in 
fields with persistent vacancies and skills mismatches, the new policy for Jobs, Growth and 
Investment makes no reference to the need of a comprehensive economic migration 
strategy and its beneficial impact on EU competitiveness38. 
 
 
 
                                          
36 See, in this regard, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1398_eu_single_permit_directive.pdf. 
37 EMN 2013, p. 6. 
38 Jean-Claude Juncker, Opening Statement, “A new Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and 
Democratic change”, Political Guidelines, 2014. See also the Employment Package (2012). 
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3.2. The lack of coordination mechanisms between Member States 
for EU level policy implementation 
 
In 2001, the Commission launched an initiative inspired by the “open method of 
coordination” (OMC). This was presented as a key instrument of the Lisbon strategy to 
direct Member States’ actions towards certain common objectives in areas controlled by 
them such as employment, education or social security. This “soft” intergovernmental 
method (based on varying non-binding measures for Member States) has not been 
implemented in the field of labour migration. But it did show the need for Member States to 
coordinate their actions when implementing this policy.  
 
In 2008, the Commission tried to reopen the debate by presenting a communication 
entitled “Common Immigration Policy for Europe”39. Ten common principles were proposed 
therein, together with a selection of concrete actions: notably promoting clear and 
transparent rules, a fair treatment of third-country nationals and better matching skills and 
needs of EU labour markets. The methodology consisted in an assessment of each Member 
States’ immigration profiles, as regards participation in the national labour market and the 
skills composition of immigration flows (both actual and potential). Member States were, 
therefore, expected to annually report to the Commission on the implementation of the 
common objectives and on their national immigration profiles, this serving as the basis for 
the Commission’s annual synthesis report to be sent to the European Council and the 
European Parliament. In its First Annual Report, the Commission indicated that most 
Member States reported on labour migration policies to address labour shortages at 
national level40. The Commission went on to emphasise the need for improvements when 
reporting on labour matching and skills recognition and on important national 
developments in future Annual Reports41.  
 
When the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was adopted at the initiative of the 
French presidency, it was decided to organise a yearly debate within the Council about the 
immigration and asylum policies. The major issues at stake included organising legal 
immigration, controlling irregular immigration, improving border controls, creating a Europe 
of asylum and finally better collaboration with countries of origin and transit. Unfortunately, 
after two previous editions following the order of commitments subscribed by the EU and 
its Member States, the Annual Report of 2011 changed form, on the basis of a new tracking 
method for monitoring the implementation of the Pact. It has never been the object of the 
strategic debate envisaged in the European Council (de Bruycker 2012).  
 
As regards the second dimension of the Pact, Member States rapidly expressed concerns 
regarding operations of massive regularisation, mostly led by EU Southern countries in 
2005, in order to tackle both irregular migration and irregular work. Several of them asked 
for a mechanism obliging Member States to mutually inform each other regarding the 
adoption of national measures likely to have a negative impact on all (or some) EU Member 
States42. While such complaints might be understandable, due to the risk of attraction 
generated by collective regularisations, it remains yet doubtful that a case-by-case or 
individual approach of regularisation will be better adapted to manage national labour 
markets and to regulate migratory flows on a larger scale. 
                                          
39 EC, Communication on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools, COM(2008) 359 
final. 
40 EC, Staff Working Paper, First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2009), SEC(2010) 535 final, p. 3. 
41 EC, Report on First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2009), COM(2010) 214 final. 
42 See Council Decision 2006/688/EC of 5 October 2006 on the establishment of a mutual information mechanism 
concerning Member States’ measures in the areas of asylum and immigration.  
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In 2009, another attempt was made to coordinate Member States’ actions when imposing 
sanctions against employers of irregular third-country nationals. With the aim of ensuring 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures in all EU Member States, directive 
2009/5243 obliges employers, before recruiting a third-country national, to check that they 
are authorised to stay, and if not, to notify the relevant national authority. Within this 
context, Member States are expected to carry out targeted inspections, based primarily on 
a risk assessment, and to communicate data to the Commission, both in absolute numbers 
and as a percentage of the employers for each sector. In 2014, when reporting on the 
Directive’s implementation in 2014, the Commission however noted that “substantial 
efforts” remained to be made by Member States “to improve not only their reporting on 
inspections, but also inspections themselves and their prioritisation efforts through 
systematic identification of sectors at risk”44. Indeed, while the Commission’s proposal 
wanted 10% of registered companies to be checked45, a table included at the end of its 
report showed that the number of inspections effectively conducted varied among Member 
States; from 79 in Estonia to 243,847 in Italy. For their part, Germany carried out 122,577 
inspections, France 1,331, Spain 53,671 and Poland 2,776.  
 
Finally, the creation of the European Migration Network (EMN) in 2008 is another example 
of a coordination mechanism envisaged by the EU to progress even modestly towards a 
common migration policy46. Its role is, however, limited to provide “up-to-date and 
comparable information on migration and asylum topics to policy makers and the general 
public”. Consequently, it serves more as an information exchange platform than as a real 
coordination support office compared to FRONTEX or the EASO, playing a stronger role in 
the concrete development of the external borders policy or of the Common European 
Asylum System. Even if the EMN is aimed to support EU institutions in its decision-making 
process47, it stops short of establishing a migration policy review mechanism.  
 
                                          
43 Council Directive 2009/52/EC providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of 
illegally staying third-country nationals. 
44 EC, Communication on the application of Directive 2009/52/EC providing for minimum standards on sanctions 
and measures against employers of illegally staying third country nationals, COM(2014) 286 final. 
45 Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying document to the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals 
- Impact assessment {COM(2007)249 final} {SEC(2007)596} {SEC(2007)604}. 
46 Council Decision 2008/381. 
47 Art. 1(2) of Council Decision 2008/381 specifies that the EMN’s objective is to “meet the information needs of 
Community institutions and of MS’ authorities and institutions on migration and asylum”. 
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Box 2. The principle of EU preference 
The European Union preference (or priority) governing the access of migrants to the labour 
market is always presented as a key principle of the EU, but understanding precisely what 
it means and requires is difficult. It is fundamental to underline that the priority is not 
purely “European”: the idea is not to privilege EU citizens over third-country nationals 
residing in the EU, but logically from an economic point of view, to prioritise the latter over 
third-country labour migrants coming from third countries. For the rest, literature on the 
issue is scarce and even the legal basis of the principle is difficult to identify: 
 
 there are of course the last accession treaties following which Member States shall 
give priority to new EU citizens from the acceding States over third-country 
workers. But the validity of these provisions is limited to the transitional period (a 
maximum of seven years) generally applicable in case of enlargement before the 
full freedom of movement of workers becomes applicable; 
 
 all the immigration directives contain a provision referring to the principle, but 
these are “may clauses” allowing and not obliging Member States to apply the 
priority. This raises a key question about the nature of the principle: it seems to be 
non-binding rather than a legal obligation;  
 
 finally, there are some technical provisions in the Regulation 492/2011 on freedom 
of movement for workers about the exchange of information on vacancies and 
applications for work between the employment services of the Member States that 
are implemented through EURES (the network of the European Employment 
Services made of a mobility portal and 850 advisers located in the Member States 
managed by DG Employment of the Commission). But, once again, an analysis of 
these provisions leads to the conclusion that the principle is relative because 
Member States are only obliged to give to EU workers the same priority as to 
nationals, meaning that they can give no priority at all. Even if this is not the case 
in practice, the efficacy of the system is limited as it covers only the vacancies 
communicated to the employment services of Member States, which represent a 
limited number (around 30% to 40% at best) of the total vacancies in the absence 
of an obligation for employers to recruit through the public employment services. 
 
A rather surprising conclusion of this brief analysis is that the principle of EU preference is 
ill-defined and seems largely left to the discretion of Member States. Actually, very little is 
known about the way it is implemented in practice at national level, for instance through 
labour market tests (LMTs) in individual cases or the listing of labour-short occupations (in 
this regard, see EMN 2015b). In this respect, there is a possibly useful parallel: the 
literature related to the Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
about the economic needs test (ENTs) applied before the admission of a physical person as 
a service provider on the territory of a State. However, those tests have mainly a national 
dimension (for instance through an obligation to advertise the vacancy in newspapers of 
the concerned country). This is not in line with the idea of EU preference. The 
implementation of the principle in practice and its articulation with the EURES system is, 
therefore, an issue for further studies that could lead to recommendations about how to 
improve the link to be made between European employment and immigration policies.  
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4. THE IMPACT OF EU LABOUR MIGRATION POLICIES AND 
LEGISLATION ON MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS AND THE 
LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Available data do not allow for a thorough assessment of the impact and 
effectiveness of immigration policies on migrant flows and – especially – on migrant 
composition in terms of their reasons for entrance: family reunification beneficiaries, 
refugees, workers and students. Only very limited quantitative studies have been 
conducted in a systematic and comparative way at an EU level. This lack of data 
and research severely limits our ability to understand and design an 
evidence-based EU labour migration policy. 
 However, the low level use of EU labour migration policy tools, such as the 
Researchers or the Blue Card Directives, indicate that the impact of EU labour 
migration policy on migratory movements is very limited.  
 Empirical evidence reveals that migrants do not integrate into the labour 
market to the same extent as native workers. They have lower wages and are 
more likely to be unemployed than native workers with the same characteristics. 
 Many migrants will ultimately become EU citizens48. It is, therefore, important that 
the policies and measures to improve their integration into the European 
labour markets start at an early stage. If possible before departure from their 
countries of origin.  
4.1. Capturing the impact of immigration policies on migration 
flows 
Research on the link between migration policies and the quantity and profiles of immigrant 
inflows is quite recent. It is a key issue because in the past many analysts were convinced 
that the forces of market supply push factors and demand pull factors were so strong that 
migration policies were not effective.  
 
In fact, the effectiveness of labour immigration policies depends mainly on: 
 
- first, conditions in the labour market (excess demand); 
- second, the institutional setting of the country, including the actual enforcement of 
the legislation, and 
- third, the country’s location (as much in geographical as in cultural and historical 
terms), which determines the intensity of migration pressures (close to sending 
countries or far from them). 
 
                                          
48 According to Eurostat statistics extracted in May 2015, in 2013 871,300 TCNs residing in an EU Member State 
acquired EU citizenship, with an average naturalization rate of 2.9% in relation to the total number non-national 
citizens residing at the beginning of the year. This was the highest number of naturalization in any year since 
2002. Half of those new EU citizens were 32 years old or less, i.e., with a long active life before them. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Acquisition_of_citizenship_statistics.  
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In relation to institutional issues, in southern European countries, for instance, the large 
underground economy acted as an important pull factor for irregular migrants. Irregular 
migrants, thus, came in the 1980s to 2000s, and the subsequent regularizations, 
implemented by the four southern destination countries, reinforced this channel. 
 
Academic research has devoted a lot of attention to the impact of migration policies on the 
inflows of migrants. In this respect, we do not tackle here the gap existing between public 
discourse and migration legislation on paper, to use de Haas and Czaika’s (2013) words. 
Rather we look at the capacity of legislation on paper and its implementation to affect the 
size and composition of migration inflows. In this regard: 
 
1. more open or more restrictive immigration policies affect the inflows of migrants 
(number); 
2. migration policy type also affects migrant inflows: point system vs. quota 
system; conditions for family reunification; admission of foreign students or 
highly-skilled migrants… 
 
The bulk of existing research focuses on the effect of the policies on the quantity of inflows 
and much less on the composition of inflows. In the traditional model income differentials, 
employment differentials, physical distance, languages similarities and other additional 
variables are included in the equation as pull factors. The impact of change in legislation is 
captured through the introduction of a dummy variable.49 In general, the change in 
migration legislation is captured by a binary variable, taking into account the 
implementation of more restrictive or more open policies or the introduction, for instance, 
of a family reunification program. 
 
In general, the coefficients of such dummy variables, which quantify their impact on 
migration flows can be significant. However, they can also be irrelevant due to the time any 
legislation implemented takes to produce its effects: indeed, this often happens after 
economic conditions in the country have changed, so that in the empirical analyses the 
impact of migration policies is already captured by the economic variables. Let us recall, for 
example, the restrictive effect of North European migration policies in the early 1970s. In 
that case, the reduction of inflows was already captured by the reduced probability of 
finding a job and the coefficient for the dummy variable for the restrictive policy in 
Germany and in general in North Europe was not significant. In addition, the total stock of 
migrants did not decline, because family reunification increased and return incentives were 
not effective in encouraging migrants to go back home: migrants preferred to stay in 
destination countries (Venturini 2004; Hatton 2005). 
 
However, the introduction of dummy variables is far from being satisfactory as a means to 
capture the impact of immigration policies. They are employed only to increase the controls 
within the regression analysis. They remain, though, approximate variables (proxies) and 
can only be used in time series analyses for individual countries. They also pose problems 
related to the time framework of policy adoption and implementation: change in policy can 
be adopted at the end of a year but implemented in the following one etc. For that reason, 
other authors, in particular Mayda and Patel (2004), tried to build a more sophisticated 
measure, a kind of index designed to compare policy changes of different intensities: very 
restrictive, rather restrictive, neutral, very open etc. This represented a step forward in 
                                          
49 A dummy variable is an artificial variable designed introduced in a regression equation to capture the 
significance of a certain factor which usually takes the values 0 or 1 depending on the presence or the absence of 
a contextual effect, for instance the implementation or not of a policy or the belonging or not to a certain group of 
countries… 
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research terms: the index used in the time series analyses of international flows by Mayda 
(2007) was significant and interacted with the push and pull variables, confirming the 
prevalence of pull factors. 
 
Unfortunately, all the commendable efforts of economists were constrained by the lack of 
information on the implementation of different policies. In Europe, in particular, there is 
hardly any data on the financial resources invested in the implementation of migration 
policies50; while, for instance, in the USA there are public data on the financial and human 
resources investment in the control of the Mexican frontier. 
 
This difficulty has pushed economists onto another type of exercise. The IMPALA project 
(Beine et al. 2014) aims to create and update an inventory of all the migration policy 
interventions looking at many dimensions. A large group of economists employed a list of 
questions with different dimensions in such a way as to have comparative and time series 
measures for policy evolution through time. The interest of this approach lies in the fact 
that this policy evaluation and the set of background questions used to develop the dataset 
cover specific channels of entrance as refugees, family reunified members and labour 
migrants. In this way, it allows for an analysis of changes in legislation. This can, in turn, 
be used to understand the variations in national migration legislation across countries and 
to understand the possibility of coordination, as well as their effects in pursuing different 
policy objectives.  
 
On the composition of migration flows and the effectiveness of migration policies there is 
much less research: in particular, there is very little comparative research. First, few and 
scarcely comparable data are available on specific migrant categories. Second, many 
policies targeting specific migrant categories are relatively recent (see e.g. highly-skilled 
migration schemes), meaning that we hardly have long time-series. The latter are, instead, 
fundamental in policy analysis: i.e. in determining the effect of a new policy or changes in 
policy on outcomes of interest (Pickup, 2015). Finally, the existence of several policy levels 
(EU, national and sometimes regional or local) may create difficulties in capturing 
interaction effects at different levels51. An interesting attempt has been carried out by 
Czaika and Parson (2015), who defined, with a survey, different categories of selective 
migration policies for highly-skilled workers (point system, demand driven, etc.) in ten 
destination countries. They then used these migration policies categories in analyzing the 
migration flows of highly-skilled workers in ten destination countries from 153 countries of 
origin for twelve years. Unfortunately, among the EU Member States only Sweden and the 
United Kingdom are included. Thus, the small number of EU countries and the use of a very 
rough proxy of employment in highly-skilled occupations (ISCO codes 1-2-3) reduce its 
relevance for present purposes. 
 
In terms of EU labour migration policy tools (such as the Researchers Directive or the Blue 
Card Directive described in Section 3.1 above), the actual impact of migratory movements 
has been very limited so far. This is due to the low level of use evidenced by all official 
evaluations summarized in Section 3.1, with very low numbers of work permits granted on 
the basis of such instruments. It is also a question of the recent adoption of many of them, 
which are not yet fully implemented: this is the case with the Seasonal Workers Directive 
and the ICT Directive. 
                                          
50 One can refer to http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/, but it is a journalistic rather than an scientific or policy-
making exercise.  
51 Research is much more developed, instead, in non EU Member States (e.g. Australia, Canada, and the United 
States), both because their highly-skilled migration schemes are well rooted and long-standing and because 
annual data are much more detailed and widely available.  
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Across EU Member States, labour migration policies often focus on the following categories 
of migrant workers: highly-skilled migrants in general; entrepreneurs; self-employed; 
seasonal workers; investors; and researchers. It is not uncommon that migrants working in 
specific occupations, such as IT, healthcare, academia, sport, or others are targeted by 
migration policies. Here, we will focus specifically on highly-skilled migration policies and 
their implementation because of their relevance in the current migration policy debate and 
also because, no systematic and comparative study has been conducted on other migrant 
categories: to be fair, data issues there are more problematic. The role of highly-skilled 
migrants has been emphasized by recent empirical findings. According to these findings 
highly-skilled migrants generate a more positive net fiscal contribution (given their higher 
earnings and employment opportunities) (Boeri, 2010). But they also tend to favour labour 
market innovation (Venturini, 2013). Accordingly, public opinion and attitudes towards 
migrants are generally more positive (see Box 3 in Section 5). Not surprisingly, a number 
of countries that have high levels of immigration have moved towards greater skill selection 
in their immigration policies (Belot and Hatton, 2012), even if the relevance of such skills 
selection in filling actual labour market shortages across EU Member States is debatable 
(see Section 2 above). 
 
In addition to the EU acquis analysed in Section 3, EU Member States have thus adopted 
different national policies and strategies to attract highly-skilled workers. Overall, the 
situation can be summarized as follows. Five EU Member States have point-based systems 
in place: Austria, Netherlands, Slovenia, the UK and the Czech Republic. There are 
important differences but all can be considered both “supply and demand driven”: i.e. they 
focus on both addressing labour shortages and on identifying third-country nationals which 
can add a high value to the national labour market. An employer-led approach – i.e. 
subject to EU preferences – has been adopted in sixteen Member States: Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In addition, Member States 
have adopted specific strategies including fast-tracking procedures, unrestricted access to 
the labour market, awareness and information provision, employer sponsorship, favourable 
conditions for family reunification, taxation and access to social security benefits, etc. 
(EMN, 2013). 
 
As already noted, assessing their implementation gap52 is not a straightforward task. 
Despite important limitations53, some qualitative evidence is provided by national 
evaluation schemes. A recent study conducted by EMN (2013) employed such schemes and 
identified the following good practices in the areas of: 
 
‐ information provision (provision of relevant up to-date information and guidance to 
migrants and employers from third countries and the establishment of focal points): 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovenia; 
‐ adaptation of migration procedures (replacing generic highly-skilled routes by more 
specialised routes, maintaining an open, employer-driven system): The Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom;  
                                          
52 According to Czaika and de Haas (2015), the implementation gap identifies the discrepancy between policies on 
paper and their actual implementation, first source of a possible real “policy failure”.  
53 They are constrained by two main issues. First, only a few Member States have adopted specific evaluation 
systems to assess the impact of policies aimed at attracting highly-qualified migrants. Second, they employ a 
qualitative approach, relying on subjective evaluations, reports and expert interviews leading to a high degree of 
subjectivity in the assessment.  
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‐ the introduction of incentives to attract (highly) qualified migrants (tax advantages, 
improved family reunification rights): Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, the 
Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden;  
‐ the customisation of labour market practices (ensuring that highly-qualified third-
country nationals are employed in sectors with a shortage of domestic supply, 
involvement of national institutions in scrutinising the suitability of applicants: 
Luxemburg, Slovenia and the UK. 
 
This study also reports a series of statistics on immigration flows by level of education and 
by EU Member States concluding: “over the period 2008-2012, a number of Member States 
which had specific policies and measures in place to attract (highly) qualified immigrants 
saw an increase in their proportion on the total number of employees in these occupational 
levels”. This was the case for Luxembourg, Germany and the UK (EMN, 2013). Though of 
interest, it is worth mentioning that descriptive findings do not contribute to a better 
understanding of the link between highly-skilled migration trends and related policies. They 
help neither in terms of correlation or a causal perspective.  
 
On the other hand, quantitative empirical findings are found in another – though limited – 
set of studies. By using a dummy approach like the one described above, the effect of the 
Schengen Agreement has been widely investigated. Beine et al. (2011) found that a 
“Schengen dummy” – indicating whether pairs of countries are subject to the Schengen 
agreement within the European Union – significantly raised the share of highly-skilled 
migrants. A similar effect was found by Ortega and Peri (2009). Interestingly enough, Beine 
et al. (2011) concluded that the effectiveness of policies aiming at increasing the 
educational level of immigrants may be constrained by the presence of a large diaspora, 
enabling an influx of lower-educated migrants. Thus, as noted by Czaika and de Haas 
(2015), “in the presence of large immigrant populations, skill-selective migration policies 
might fail unless family reunification programs are deeply reformed and limited, which is 
generally not possible because of constitutional and human rights constraints”. 
 
The effect of selective immigration policies was also the focus of a study from Belot and 
Hatton (2012). These policies are here viewed as screening mechanisms, which imposed 
differential costs on potential immigrants by skill and education. Due to the lack of 
comprehensive indicators, they rely on a set of proxies: a) the responses of business 
executives on the question on how far immigration policies permit the hiring of foreign 
employees (greater flexibility is interpreted as representing more employment-friendly 
policy); b) the restrictiveness of the country’s policy towards professional workers (Nguyen 
Hong, 2000); and c) a dummy variable for countries selecting skills through a points 
system. Interestingly enough, they also considered the generosity of the welfare state 
(proxied by the share of social spending in GDP), often seen as attracting less-skilled 
migrants (Boeri et al., 2002; Di Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009; Boeri, 2010). As for their main 
results, they found evidence that points systems and policies that encourage the transfer of 
professional skills are positively and significantly associated with increasing levels of highly-
skilled migrants’ share. On the contrary, as expected, negative welfare magnet selection 
effects are found. 
 
As recognized by the authors, a main limitation in this analysis is that “these measures are 
only partial and they do not capture the potentially large effects of policies towards family 
reunification and refugees” (Belot and Hatton, 2012). It is widely believed that immigration 
policies that place greater weight on family reunification and refugees are likely to select 
lower-skilled immigrants. Accordingly, Grogger and Hanson (2010) found that the share of 
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asylum seekers – used to proxy immigration policy – has a negative effect on both the 
educational selection of migrants and sorting across destinations.  
 
We can conclude that much needs to be done on assessing the effect of immigration 
policies on migrant flows and – especially – on migrant composition. The main challenges 
are related to the lack of time-series and the relatively recent implementation of national 
and EU schemes for highly-skilled migrants. A more severe situation in terms of policy 
evaluation concerns other migrant categories for which data issues are still more 
pronounced. No quantitative study has yet been conducted in a systematic and 
comparative way at the EU level. Any kind of evaluation system is also challenged by the 
lack of information on the resource level invested in implementing these policies. Clearly 
enough, this limits, too, the work of EU national evaluation points, which can evaluate 
policies effects only from a qualitative viewpoint, an important but not an adequately 
rigorous approach. 
 
4.2. The labour market integration of economic and non-economic 
migrants in the EU 
In this Section, we will concentrate on the integration of migrants in the labour market by 
reporting information on the three main measures of integration: employment; mismatch 
between occupation and education; and remuneration, which is a synthetic index of worker 
integration. 
 
Definition: A foreign worker is considered integrated in the labour market if, for instance, 
his or her wage is equal to the remuneration of a native workers with the same 
characteristics: age, sex, education, seniority in the labour market, sector and region of 
employment and other control variables.54 
 
The empirical research in this field is well developed. There are analyses on the integration 
of foreign workers in the labour market for all countries and a few comparative studies 
which are necessarily less sophisticated because they are constrained by comparable data 
availability.  
 
Traditional research on labour market integration 
In the following, we briefly present the results and we explain how they should be 
interpreted. Interestingly, the results of most national or comparative studies are similar. 
Migrants do not integrate easily, they have lower wages and they are more likely to be 
unemployed than native workers with the same characteristics. Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 8 
summarize the labour market integration gap of migrants in relation to natives.  
 
                                          
54 See Venturini (2014), Keynote speech at the annual IMISCOE Conference, Madrid. 
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Table 2. EU and non-EU immigrant-native employment rate differentials  
 EU 
(1) 
Non-EU 
(2) 
EU 
(3) 
Non EU 
(4) 
EU 
(5) 
Non-Eu 
(6) 
Austria -0.058** -0.128** -0.048** -0.129** -0.059** -0.118** 
Belgium -0.088** -0.207** -0.062** -0.195** -0.029** -0.197** 
Germany -0.053** -0.219** -0.067** -0.227** -0.032** -0.162** 
Denmark -0.028** -0.118** -0.029** -0.121** -0.034** -0.146** 
Spain -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.011* -0.059** -0.044** 
Finland 0.032* -0.122** 0.030* -0.119** -0.013 -0.150** 
France -0.065** -0.135** -0.074** -0.151** -0.010 -0.129** 
Greece 0.012* 0.040** 0.045** 0.026** 0.003 0.003 
Ireland 0.015** -0.028** 0.013** -0.027** -0.035** -0.130** 
Italy 0.042** 0.048** 0.044** 0.010** -0.027** -0.032** 
Netherlands -0.053** -0.149** -0.043** -0.147** -0.061** -0.156** 
Norway 0.019* -0.100** 0.014 -0.105** -0.009 -0.108** 
Portugal 0.069** 0.041** 0.069** 0.042** -0.029** -0.022** 
Sweden -0.090** -0.158** -0.094** -0.167** -0.079** -0.174** 
UK 0.037** -0.073** 0.033** -0.076** 0.013* -0.101** 
Year & quarter 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gender No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age No No No No Yes Yes 
Education No No No No Yes Yes 
The table reports differences in employment probability between EU (columns 1-3-5) or non-EU (columns 
2-4-6) immigrants and natives. The values are the estimated coefficients of separate regressions by 
country of a dummy for having a job on dummies for EU and non-EU immigrants. Separate regressions are 
run for each country. The sample are individuals in working-age population not in military service and not in 
education or training. We define an individual as in employment if she is employed or self-employed. 
Year and quarter effects: year-quarter interaction dummies. Gender: dummy for female. Age: dummies for 
five-year age groups. Education: dummies for lower secondary, secondary and tertiary education. 
* difference significant at 10%, ** difference significant at 1% 
Source: Dustmann and Frattini, 2012. Data from EULFS, years 2007-2009. 
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Table 3. EU and non-EU immigrant-native occupation differentials 
 EU 
(1) 
Non-EU 
(2) 
EU 
(3) 
Non EU 
(4) 
EU 
(5) 
Non-Eu 
(6) 
Austria 0.075** -0.584** -0.103** -0.429** -0.053** -0.047** 
Belgium 0.039** -0.350** -0.010 -0.294** -0.006 -0.082** 
Germany -0.181** -0.509** -0.103** -0.295** -0.049** -0.066** 
Denmark 0.064* -0.310** -0.076** -0.248** -0.026** -0.044** 
Spain -0.405** -0.620** -0.445** -0.492** -0.082** -0.081** 
Finland 0.073* -0.199** 0.113** 0.141** 0.008 -0.038** 
France -0.232** -0.173** -0.182** -0.232** -0.029** -0.036** 
Greece -0.525** -0.845** -0.477** -0.591** -0.112** -0.121** 
Ireland -0.263** -0.008 -0.249** -0.221** 0.001 -0.108** 
Italy -0.603** -0.779** -0.595** -0.634** -0.114** -0.125** 
Netherlands 0.028 -0.344** -0.100** -0.252** 0.007 -0.026** 
Norway 0.158** -0.317** -0.049* -0.336** -0.015 -0.056** 
Portugal 0.295** -0.006 -0.111** -0.317** -0.024* -0.071** 
Sweden 0.006 -0.333** -0.118** -0.381** 0.010** -0.036** 
UK -0.208** 0.069** -0.237** -0.115** -0.039** -0.030** 
Year & quarter 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gender No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1-digit Occupation No No No No Yes Yes 
This table reports the differences (as fractions of a country-specific standard deviation) in Socio-Economic 
Index (SEI) of EU (columns 1-3-5) and non-EU (columns 2-4-6) immigrant workers relative to native 
workers. The values are the estimated coefficients of separate regressions by country of the ISEI index 
(normalized by its standard deviation) on dummies for EU and non-EU immigrants and year-quarter 
interaction dummies (columns 1-2), and other control variable (columns 3-6). Year and quarter effects: 
same as in Table 2. * difference significant at 10%, ** difference significant at 1% 
Source: Dustmann and Frattini, 2012. Data from EULFS, years 2007-2009. 
 
Figure 8. Earning distribution 
 
The figure reports the share of natives (circles), EU immigrants (rhomb) and non-EU immigrants (squares) 
in each decile of the national earning distribution in Belgium, Germany, Finland, France and Italy pooled.  
Source: Dustmann and Frattini, 2012. Data from EULFS 2009.  
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These differentials decline with the number of years of stay in the country of destination; 
highly-skilled migrants have a higher probability of employment than low skilled migrants. 
They are, though, on average more educated than a comparable native with the same 
position. Some national groups present a lower assimilation rate with respect to other 
national groups. Knowledge of the language spoken in the destination country plays a very 
important role in this respect. The education in the country of destination presents higher 
returns in the labour market than education in the origin country. If the differential remains 
after controlling for all the variables mentioned, frequently the hypothesis of discrimination 
comes up. It is, however, very difficult to argue in this direction because the empirical 
exercises compare: the performances of different school systems; different levels of 
knowledge of the language of the country of destination etc. It is more correct to argue 
that the differential is not explained by the different measured characteristics of the labour 
force. If the differential, after all the controls, is higher than 30% the hypothesis of 
discrimination can be taken more seriously. But other methodologies of analyses are more 
appropriate for understanding this field. For instance, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) in Sweden 
inquire into the probability of upgrades by changing names of origin into others which are 
more similar to the destination country’s names. Duguet et al. (2010) analyzed the 
probability of getting a job for a migrant with a changed name in Paris and found similar 
results. 
 
To cope with the underassimilation of migrants in the labour market, a series of integration 
policies focused on economic integration are implemented, in general at local level but also 
at national level. Integration policies try to cope with the disadvantages of migrants by 
increasing their chances of finding a job through language courses, specific training course, 
job placing support, etc. They are managed mainly at local level by local authorities. The 
European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (now transformed into the 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, AMIF) provides financial support to Member States 
to organize integration interventions for third national countries and Member States fund 
additional interventions with their own budgets.  
 
What else affects migrant integration? 
The integration of migrants into the destination labour market is, however, affected by 
three other set of actions intervening upstream:  
 
a) the migration policy strictu sensu, namely the legislation which specifies the rules 
for the admission of migrants (types of permits, duration, selection criteria etc.) and 
its actual implementation, but also integration policies as described above;  
b) the characteristics of the labour market and its functioning, and 
c) the interventions of the country of origin. 
 
These factors are represented in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9. Determinants of migrant labour market integration 
 
Source: Venturini 2014, Keynote speech at the Annual IMISCOE conference in Madrid. 
 
In this way, the same legislation, for example a point system which gives a premium for 
tertiary education in mathematics and engineering, will likely produce high integration in 
Germany: in Germany there is a high demand for these skills, with very limited over-
education. In the Southern European countries, meanwhile, where the outflows of tertiary 
educated natives with degrees in mathematics and engineering is sizable, it will result in 
increased unemployment or over-education. The demand side is relevant, then, but also all 
the institutions affecting the functioning of the labour market, such as trade unions, social 
security systems, job intermediation institutions, training provided etc. Even in those 
countries with the highest numbers of migrant workers, their share in the labour market 
remains relatively low: under 11% of the total labour force, with the exception of 
Luxembourg. In this respect they are not important enough to affect the structure of the 
labour market as such, and national specificities dominate its functioning.  
 
The recent research by Guzi, Kahaneck, Mýtna Kureková (2015) measures the native-
migrant wage differentials of different institutions including the type of economic system 
(coordinated, liberal, mixed and emerging market economy); and the dominance of trade 
unions. The results show that different economic systems and different trade union 
intensities matter. Migrants are better off in liberal market economies (e.g. the UK and 
Ireland) and in emerging economies (new accession countries), and trade union intensity 
favours their integration. 
 
A very important role in favouring the integration of migrants in the labour market falls, 
however, to the immigration policy. As is well known, national legislation and the 
transposition of EU legislation differ across countries (the UK, for instance, is not part of the 
Schengen Agreement). But just as important, if not more so, is the implementation of 
legislation, which is embodied in the institutional structure of the destination country. So to 
use Hein De Haas and Mathias Czaika (2013) terms, it is not only that legislation on paper 
differs from place to place, but their varied implementation increases the differences.  
 
In addition, in one single country different communities with the same human capital can 
perform in very different ways, because some are guided and supported by policies and 
actions of the country of origin before departure and after arrival (see INTERACT research 
project, MPC, 2014-2015)55. The country of origin, through its public employment services, 
                                          
55 http://interact-project.eu/.  
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can help migrants in finding a job abroad, it can provide pre-departure training to help 
matching in the destination country (see the case of the Philippines) or provide support at 
arrival (through services by labour attachés at embassies for instance). Thus given the 
same migration policy and labour market at destination, the country of origin can help its 
citizens in reducing employment under-assimilation and brain waste. The country of origin 
also has a broader role in the construction of the human capital of migrants. It can build up 
the fields of education in demand and can control the quality of the education and by these 
policies increase future remuneration in the destination country. 
 
Thus to understand the dynamic of the integration of migrants in the destination labour 
market and to improve the functioning of the process by changing the legislation on paper 
or its implementation we should consider three main actors:  
 
‐ the country of origin and the possibility of shaping the implementation of any 
migration policy decided and adopted by the destination country. This might be, for 
instance, through bilateral agreements (i.e. accepting double citizenship which 
allows a more flexible migration path, incentives to return policies…) or with specific 
interventions to improve the human capital and favor the integration of potential 
and future migrants; 
‐ the country of destination with its many instruments: the migration policy strictu 
sensu, the legislation of the labour market and, last but not least, integration 
policies; this, also, include other institutional actors as mentioned above: trade 
unions, employers, etc.; and  
‐ the migrants themselves, who work their way towards permanent or temporary 
integration according to their individual migration project and the opportunities they 
have to implement it. 
 
Main limitations of the traditional approach on labour market integration 
We have already stressed that there are some important limitations in the traditional 
approach to the analyses of the performance of migrants in the destination countries. We 
have noted, too, that integration policies frequently address problems that could be 
avoided by the fine-tuning of previous “migratory interventions” put in place by the country 
of origin and destination.  
 
However, the most important limitation is that very few studies (for instance Lemaitre 2014 
and Damas de Matos and Liebig 2014) are able to distinguish the labour market 
performance of migrants according to the reason of entrance. This is mainly imputable to 
limitations on the data: only in 2008 did the European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS) 
present this distinction, then it failed to include it again. Thus the (limited) existing 
comparative analyses are based mainly on that source. 
 
The composition of the migrant population and the composition of the migrant labour forces 
are very similar by reason of entrance (see Table 3 Lemaître 2014, p. 351): 50% of the 
foreign population entered through the family reunification “door” (Borjas 1999), while only 
30% enter through the labour “door” and the remainder are “refugees”. In Figure 10 the 
two columns for each country show first the stock of foreign residents by type of permit, 
and second the foreign labour force by reason of entrance, and it is clear that in both the 
share of family members is larger than the others. 
 
 52 
Figure 10. A comparison of labour force survey (LFS) and of OECD standardized permit data 
(non-EU migrants), 2005-08 cumulative 
 
Source: Lemaître, 2014, p. 351. Data from EULFS ad-hoc inmigrant module and OECD standardised immigration.  
 
This has very important implications, because it shows that all the entrants end up in the 
labour market, but not all of them enjoy the same labour market integration performance. 
Labour migrant workers perform better than reunified family members and refugees. 
 
Damas de Matos and Liebig (2014) using the 2008 EU Labour Force Survey show that the 
workers who entered as family members or refugees have lower levels of education (fewer 
years), but that the incidence of overeducation is much higher among family members 
(23.2% more than natives) and refugees (34.2%) than among labour migrants (18%). It 
is, also, stronger among the migrants educated outside the EU27 countries. In Figure 11 
there is a graphic representation of overeducation by reason of entrance and the spike in 
family members provide a clear picture of the results. A work of comparative research by 
George Borjas (1988) between Australia, Canada and the USA demonstrates that the lower 
economic performance of the immigrants in the USA(-5%) has to be imputed to the earlier 
introduction of the family reunification: this allowed the entrance of family members who 
were not in demand in the labour market. 
 
Figure 11. Overqualification rates of recent immigrants by reason for migrating and of 
native-born persons of the same age distributions, 2008 
 
Note: A worker is deemed to be overqualified if holding a tertiary degree and working in a job 
classified as medium or low-skilled (ISCO 4-9).  
Source: Lemaître, 2014, p. 360. Data from Eurostat Labour Force Survey ad-hoc immigrant module. 
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The differential performance of the reunified family members is expected because family 
members in general are not selected for their relevance for the destination labour market. 
They do not receive any pre-departure training and once arrived in the destination country 
there is a heavy focus on integration, mainly based on the idea that they should become 
future citizens. Thus they are provided with language and cultural courses, while training 
courses and labour matching opportunities are far less frequent. Occasionally, sociological 
studies discuss how family members find a job, and in general it happens through family 
and friends networks (Andall 2012). 
 
Refugees also receive different treatment in each destination country. However, in the 
countries where they are most numerous in relation to population, Sweden, they show 
comparatively higher participation rates in the welfare state and very limited integration in 
the labour market. Different strategies have been implemented to increase their 
participation by avoiding the creation of ethnic enclaves. They were redistributed in 
different areas, but this policy was not successful; they receive psychological, cultural and 
linguistic support, but they still seem unable to integrate. The new strategy implemented 
by the government aims to shorten the transition to employment considering employment 
the best integration solution. 
 
The new PIAAC dataset, an OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies which measures the ability of native and foreign workers in literacy, 
numeracy and additional tests, is also very helpful in explaining some of the differences. In 
all the tests, the average for foreign born workers is negative, with different value 
according to the country of destination (see Pasimeni et al. 2014, p. 121-122). It can be 
very helpful in understanding the needs of the foreign labour force and the appropriate 
instruments to reduce their low labour market performance. It does not, however, 
distinguish the results by reason of entrance and thus it does not clarify what can be done 
before arrival.  
 
The limited data available and the limited research focus on this subject has created a 
paradox. When looking at the forecast of future labour market needs in destination 
countries to define the characteristics of labour migration policy (number of visas, profile of 
migrants etc.), the migrants entering through non-economic migration channels are not 
taken into account. There is then the risk of letting workers in through the “labour door” 
and creating competition for migrants entering through the “family door” with similar 
profiles.  
 
The EU and the Member States should better recognize the importance of family migrants 
as (potential) economic actors in the labour market. Knowing the skills and qualifications of 
family members that are coming to the EU in an early stage could help to better connect 
these migrants to schooling and/or education opportunities or assist an early connection to 
the labour market. Pre- and post-departure training could be envisaged and a better 
transition to work might be promoted. 
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5. DOES THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION 
RESPOND TO EU NEEDS FOR LABOUR MIGRATION? 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The pillar on “A new policy on legal migration” of the European Agenda on Migration 
does not contain major novelties in relation to the current EU labour immigration 
regime.  
 The proposals lack a clear vision of future EU labour migration policy and its 
integration with labour market and employment policy. They are not really new. 
They do not build a comprehensive and coherent policy and they do not make up for 
the shortcomings of the current EU labour migration policy. Overall, they are not apt 
to respond to the identified and projected labour needs of the European Union over 
the medium- to long-term. 
 However, they open a unique opportunity to bring EU labour migration policy 
higher up in the EU political debate that should not be wasted.  
 The political sensitiveness of immigration policy and the exclusive 
competence of Member States to decide the volume of admissions of third-
country nationals to seek work are two major constraints for any policy initiative in 
this field.  
 
The section dedicated to “A new policy on legal migration” in the European Agenda on 
Migration56 does not contain any major novelty in relation to what had been already 
announced in the Political Guidelines drawn up by President Jean-Claude Juncker57. Nor 
does it offer anything alien to the overall EU policy approach in this field described in 
Section 3. The starting point of its approach is the evidence of the need for labour 
migration to the EU in the near future (see Section 2 for a thorough analysis of this issue). 
It acknowledges that, even with a determined effort over the medium and long term, 
including the launch of a “Labour Mobility Package” and a new Initiative on Skills policy 
initiatives announced for 2015, Europe is unlikely to be able to fully match its labour needs.  
 
In this context, it sets as an important objective “to have in place a clear and rigorous 
common system, which reflects the EU interest, including by maintaining Europe as an 
attractive destination for migrants”. However, the political sensitiveness and the legal 
constraints to immigration policy are put forward, as the Commission acknowledges that 
“the case for legal migration will always be difficult at a time of high unemployment and 
social change” (see a factsheet on this issue in Box 3 below). It adds that “decisions on the 
volume of admissions of third country nationals coming to seek work will remain the 
exclusive competence of Member States”. Actually, these factors may jointly explain the 
limitations of the Commission’s proposals in this field, and they set out the perimeter of 
feasible policy initiatives at the EU level. 
 
In terms of concrete actions, the European Agenda on migration contains the following 
points: 
                                          
56 EC, Communication on a European Agenda on Migration, 2015, COM(2015) 240 final. 
57 Jean-Claude Juncker, Opening Statement, “A new Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and 
Democratic change”, Political Guidelines, 2014. 
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Students and Researchers Recast Directive. It urges legislators to adopt the proposal 
already submitted by the European Commission in 2013 (COM/2013/0151). In its 2013 
proposal for the reform of existing directives applying to migrants’ researchers and 
students58, the Commission suggested granting these categories additional rights on intra-
EU mobility and access to job-seeking after the completion of their studies or their research 
project. In order to retain highly-qualified third-country nationals who have the potential to 
contribute to the national (and European) economy, Member States would, indeed, allow 
them to stay on their territory for an extra twelve months, in order to identify work 
opportunities or to set up their own businesses. After the first three months, Member 
States are entitled to check on the genuineness of this search, and after six months they 
would be able to ask migrants to prove that they have real prospects of being engaged or 
of launching a business. Students and researchers must be able to prove that they have 
sufficient resources to subsist during this extended period, which may seem paradoxical as 
the very purpose of their stay is to find a job. 
 
Review of EU Blue Card Directive. This reiterates the Commission’s intention, already 
expressed in the hearings of the Juncker Commission, to review the EU scheme for highly-
qualified third-country nationals (see discussion below in Section 6.3.1). This review should 
include issues of scope such as covering entrepreneurs who are willing to invest in Europe 
or improving the intra-EU mobility of Blue Card holders. After the adoption of the Agenda, a 
public consultation on this issue has been launched by the European Commission59, as well 
as an impact assessment study. 
 
Services-related migration. The Commission stresses the importance of this modality of 
generally short-term migration. It does so though without advancing any concrete strategy. 
In particular, it remains silent on the temporary entry of workers from third countries for 
the purposes of service provision: the equivalent of Mode 4 of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). Conceptually, such service provision-related temporary labour 
migration should be at least part of the EU negotiations of Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Areas (DCFTA) with third countries. Currently, negotiations are under way with 
Morocco, after the signature of the DCFTA with Ukraine, but the EU has refused to include 
any discussion on this issue in the negotiation agenda so far.  
 
Member States and stakeholders’ dialogue on labour migration policies. Then, 
similarly to previous coordination initiatives, the Commission reiterates its support to 
Member States “in promoting a permanent dialogue and peer evaluation at [the] European 
level regarding labour market gaps, regularisation and integration”. It does so as decisions 
by one member State have an impact on others. The objective is to “build common thinking 
and policy approaches and exchange good practices at [the] European level”. The 
Commission will also seek to establish a platform of dialogue to include input from 
businesses, the trade unions, and other social partners to maximize the benefits of 
migration for the European economy. 
 
Information tools to identify skills gaps and recruitment difficulties. The 
Commission refers to existing instruments, such as the Skills Panorama, the EU 
Immigration Portal and EURES, and advocates developing them. It does so, though, 
without pleading for a fully-fledged EU-wide labour market information system or its use for 
                                          
58 Proposal for a directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated and unremunerated training, voluntary service and au pairing 
(recast), COM(2013) 151 final. 
59 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2015/consulting_0029_en.htm.  
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international matching of labour migrants beyond the EU (see discussion below in Sections 
6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3). 
 
Recognition of qualifications. Here, the Agenda sees the role of the EU as helping to 
“improve understanding of qualifications gained outside the EU”. This is to overcome the 
problems posed for matching migrants’ skills due to a lack of recognition of qualifications 
acquired by migrants in their home country. On 30 June, DG Employment convened a 
seminar addressed to Commission staff from different Commission services and 
representatives of networks of national experts, international organizations and public and 
private stakeholders. It endeavored to take stock of different EU initiatives and how these 
interact. The seminar reviewed both existing obstacles to this interaction and noted how 
better synergies might be created in the future in the context of the European skills 
agenda. The seminar also addressed recognition from different angles: addressing 
academic recognition, recognition of professional qualifications within the EU and 
recognition of qualifications acquired in third countries.  
 
Modernization of visa policy. In this field, the Agenda commits to concluding by the end 
of 2015 a review about which nationalities require visa: for example, Peru and Columbia’s 
requirement for visas will likely be lifted. However, no new proposal related to labour 
migration is tabled in this regard. 
 
Integration of migrants. Here the Agenda notes the available resources from the Asylum 
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
and the European Social Fund (ESF). 20% of the ESF’s resources will contribute to social 
inclusion, which includes measures for the integration of migrants with a particular focus on 
those seeking asylum and refugees as well as on children. Among other actions, these 
funds can support targeted initiatives to improve language and professional skills, improve 
access to services, and promote access to the labour market. This is admirable so long as 
they can contribute to facilitate the labour market integration of non-economic migrants in 
the EU. 
 
Cooperation with third countries. Finally, instead of creating a specific pillar for 
migration and development links and cooperation with third countries, the European 
Agenda on Migration includes under the legal migration pillar “Maximizing the development 
benefits for countries of origin”. In this regard, there is no real initiative, but just a quick 
review of: the multilateral EU commitments and positions (in relation, for instance, to the 
inclusion of migration-related targets as part of the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals); bilateral agreements (in particular Mobility Partnerships); and 
cooperation in the field of labour migration management in the framework of the EU’s 
GAMM. The introductory sentence to this section, however, is rather misleading, in 
particular in the framework of current political sensitiveness on migration policies. It states 
that “the EU’s legal migration policy should also support the development of countries of 
origin”. However, in order to avoid undue confusion, the two policy objectives and policy 
areas should be clearly distinguished: whereas EU labour migration policy aims to meet the 
labour needs of EU labour markets, development cooperation in the field of migration 
should focus on maximizing the development impact of migration in countries of origin. 
Both policy areas may, of course, be complementary and find certain synergies. However, 
they should be kept clearly separated, since they pursue different objectives. 
 
“A new model of legal migration”. The European Agenda on Migration also includes a 
fourth, forward-looking pillar (“Moving Beyond”), a one page synthesis of areas in which 
the Commission considers the need for future reflections: “if we are to address these issues 
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in an effective and sustainable manner in the longer term”, it is stated, European 
cooperation in the area of migration needs to go further. The third of these areas is “[a] 
new model of legal migration”. Here, the Commission “will look at the possibility of 
developing, with the Member States, an ‘expression of interest system’”. Little is said of 
this system, which is analyzed in more detail in Section 6.3.2. below. 
 
Overall, this set of proposals do not seem to be up to the EU labour migration policy 
challenges as described in Sections 1, 2 and 3 above. They lack clear vision and ambition. 
They are not really new. They do not build a comprehensive and coherent policy. Nor do 
they make up for the shortcomings of the current EU labour migration policy (exposed in 
Section 1 above). They are not capable of responding to likely to respond to the identified 
and projected labour needs of the European Union over the medium- to long-term. 
 
The proposal was fast-tracked and consultation with social partners and labour market 
actors was kept to a minimum60: it was rushed because of the prioritizing of the European 
Agenda on Migration; the dramatic events in the Mediterranean; and increasing political 
sensitivity to migration. As a matter of fact, the Agenda defines itself as “primarily 
focus[ing] on offering solutions in the short and medium term”. As a consequence, the 
endeavor to propose a comprehensive and balanced migration policy has suffered. In this 
regard, it is not surprising that the EU Immigration Code, proposed by the Commission in 
2013 to consolidate the existing EU legal instruments, has not been included in the new 
political agenda. Indeed, without a proper implementation of consistent and binding legal 
rules adopted at the EU level, one might wonder what is the added value of yet another 
initiative in this field.  
 
In terms of policy initiatives, the European Agenda on Migration suffers from a clear bias 
towards measures and policies to fight irregular migration, to face asylum-seekers flows 
and to strengthen external borders: this at the detriment of legal labour migration or 
migration and development issues (which is not even considered as a separate policy area). 
Beyond the obvious implications for the European labour markets and economic 
competitiveness, EU credibility in relation to partner countries will suffer from this weak 
approach to legal labour migration.  
 
More fundamentally, after so many political failures (see Section 3 above), it is now time 
for the Commission to re-think the very concept of its “common” labour migration policy: It 
can opt for a soft approach, promoting greater cooperation among the EU and its Member 
States (implying for instance further policy dialogue and public consultations). 
Alternatively, it can regain its leadership, develop true review mechanisms of national 
labour migration policies, and strengthen its current legal instruments and its political 
action in this field to ensure their effective implementation. In any case, the inclusion of 
this issue in the European Agenda on Migration opens up a unique opportunity to discuss 
EU labour migration policy at the highest political level. That opportunity should not be 
wasted, but it requires a consistent public information and communication strategy on the 
realities of migration and the need for a comprehensive and coherent labour migration 
policy at EU level that unfortunately has not been included as part of the European Agenda 
on Migration (see MPC and Peter Bosch, 2015). As highlighted in Box 3 below, without such 
a strategy any policy reform in this area will be very difficult. 
 
                                          
60 An Informal Expert Group on Economic migration created by DG HOME, which held a single meeting on the 25 
March, was actually the only regular channel of consultation on this issue 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3253&New 
Search=1&NewSearch=1. 
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Box 3. Attitudes towards migrants and immigration in the EU 
Regardless of technical analysis and policy debate on the need for international labour 
migration to fill the labour and skills gaps in the EU’s labour markets, immigration has 
taken centre stage in the political debate in many European countries. It already features 
prominently in the political platforms of some political parties, including some mainstream 
ones (in the UK and France, for instance). This public debate is based largely on (often 
wrong) perceptions on the number, the profile and the integration of immigrants, rather 
than on objective facts. Generally, public debate on immigration is dominated by a series 
of stereotypes which tend to misrepresent the phenomenon and its impact (Fargues 
2014). This makes migration policy reform, both at national and EU level, politically very 
difficult. 
 
The increasing importance of this issue becomes evident in the Spring 2015 Standard 
Eurobarometer (released 31 July 2015). For the first time, the most frequent issue cited by 
European citizens as their main concern was immigration (with 38% citing it, against 24% 
in Autumn 2014), ahead of 27% citing the economic situation, which has been the main 
concern of European citizens over the last few years, and 24% citing unemployment. 
Immigration is the most frequently cited concern in 20 Member States, reaching peaks in 
Malta (65%) and Germany (55%) (see http://europa.eu/rapid/attachment/IP-15-
5451/en/ANNEX%20Spring%202015%20Standard%20Eurobarometer.pdf).  
 
General public perception is that “We do not need migrants”: analysis of the European 
Social Survey data from 2010 points to how, for over four out of ten respondents, 
immigration is perceived as leading to long-term negative effects on countries. This 
popular view holds irrespectively of the fact that Europe is experiencing population 
shrinkage, and a growing old-age dependency ratio. Indeed, immigration is seen by most 
analysis as a way of counterbalancing these trends (Fargues and Di Bartolomeo 2014).  
 
Comparative analyses of attitudes towards immigrants across countries and time. Face big 
difficulties to assess how attitudes to immigrants and immigration have evolved. Studies 
incorporating longitudinal (repeated cross-sectional) element produced mixed evidence on 
trends in attitudes, which is explained by the different time period under examination, 
different datasets used, various attitudes examined, and the explanatory factors included 
to analyse these attitudes. 
 
Generally the number of immigrants in the country tends to be overestimated by public 
opinion, and paradoxically the larger upward bias is characteristic of countries with lower 
migrant share (Citrin and Sides 2008). If we take the example of rejection towards 
admittance of new immigrants, in the early 2000s there seemed to be a “regional 
attitudinal divide” with higher shares of public opinion rejecting the new immigration in 
destinations of Southern and Eastern Europe with smaller immigration levels. Northern 
Europe and Scandinavia tended to be more welcoming (Meuleman 2009). 
 
While the general public often overestimates the actual number of immigrants and prefers 
less immigration, the typical reason behind this is because it stereotypically makes the link 
between immigration and increasing unemployment. There is, the idea that “Migrants steal 
our jobs”. This conviction that migrants take jobs from nationals is particularly pronounced 
in contexts with tougher economic conditions, which is of particular importance during the 
current crisis (Fargues and Kalantaryan 2014). Regarding to what extent Europeans are 
willing to welcome more/less migrants, it is the European Social Survey which provides 
most recent data. As Figure 12 illustrates, in Hungary opposition to new immigration from 
poorer countries outside the EU seems to be strongest, but it decreased in the last decade, 
as it did in Poland. In other new member states (Slovenia, and the Czech Republic in 
particular) negative attitudes are on the rise. This is also the case in some crisis-struck 
countries like Ireland and Portugal. Sweden has remained the country with most open 
attitudes. 
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Figure 12. Number of respondents agreeing to allow a few/no immigrants from poorer 
countries outside of Europe (%) 
 
Source: European Social Survey 2002 and 2012. 
 
As might be expected, it is persons in most vulnerable situation on the labour market (low 
skilled, unemployed, with lower education levels), who are in direct economic competition 
with immigrants who have the most negative attitudes. At the same time intergroup 
contacts seem to work in an opposite direction: people who have interactions with 
immigrants tend to display more positive sentiments. Moreover, right-wing voters are 
more likely to feel threatened and express more negative sentiments towards immigrants 
and immigration (Semyonov et al. 2006). The national context seems to matter as well, 
with more negative attitudes expressed in the contexts with: larger shares of immigrant 
coming from non-Western countries; worse economic situations; and higher votes for 
extreme right-wing parties (Meuleman et al. 2009; Schneider 2006; Semyonov et al. 
2006; Sides and Citrin 2007). Blame for stagnant wages and rising unemployment is likely 
to be put on immigrants, especially during a recession. 
 
Immigrants are often seen as a threat beyond the context of national economies. Public 
opinion tends to link immigration and crime, even if the concerns about causal link 
between the two have not been corroborated by empirical studies carried out in several EU 
Member States. Immigration may also be perceived as a threat to the collective identity of 
the host society. Especially migrants from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds may be 
seen as a threat to homogeneity of the receiving society. A particular case in point in this 
regard is Islamophobia, which has been thriving in Europe over the last decade. 
 
Moreover, increasingly high votes for far right-wing parties in several EU countries 
(Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, the UK among others) are 
largely based on spreading anti-immigrant feelings, fuelled by insufficient or misleading 
information on immigration realities. In turn, anti-immigrant sentiments raised by the far 
right enter political debates and tend to shape the discussions about migration policies and 
the preferred levels of immigration. This has a knock on effect on mainstream parties 
potentially toughening their stance on the issues of immigration and the ensuing design of 
more restrictive immigration policies, regardless of any economic consideration. This is 
why migration policies debates should be accompanied by an information strategy 
providing facts on numbers and profiles of immigrants and highlighting the benefits of 
immigration. 
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6. EXPLORING NEW AVENUES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE 
LABOUR MARKET APPROACH TO LABOUR MIGRATION IN 
THE EU: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND FEASIBILITY 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 
The analysis of existing options for developing EU labour migration policy with a 
comprehensive labour market approach suggests the following in terms of relevance 
and feasibility:  
 
 To improve labour matching within and outside the European Union, an EU-
wide Labour Market Information System and an EU labour market needs 
forecasting system integrating migration flows of non-economic migrants will be 
the basis of any effective, evidence-based labour migration policy at EU level. The 
role of private placement agencies in international labour migration 
matching should be enhanced and regulated. 
 
 To optimize existing labour force in the EU labour market: the integration of 
non-economic migrants has to be supported; the intra-EU mobility of third-country 
nationals legally working in EU Member States should be facilitated; and the 
regularization of irregular migrants, for which there is a labour market demand not 
covered by nationals or EU citizens, should be incentivized.  
 
 As for the implementation of new labour migration entry channels into the 
EU, targeted and occupation-specific job search visas might be a more 
effective instrument to match EU labour migration policy to EU labour 
market needs than supply-driven “expression-of-interest” systems or points 
systems, as suggested in the European Agenda on Migration. The on-going reform 
of the EU Blue Card should impose fewer costs on migrants and employers and 
grant more rights, in particular for intra-EU mobility, to Blue Card holders. 
 
 Foreign students graduating in EU education institutions should have some 
opportunity to access EU labour markets, and an EU Traineeship Programme for 
third-country nationals could be another good way to extend the pool of potential 
third-country nationals with required skills. More generally, the recognition and 
certification of qualifications and skills obtained in third countries by third-country 
nationals should be facilitated and progress needs to be made towards an EU-wide 
recognition system. 
 
 
Previous sections reviewed labour market shortages and labour market needs in the EU and 
analyzed to what extent the existing legal framework on legal migration responds to these. 
They also dealt with the impact of EU labour migration policies and legislation on inflows 
and the integration of migrants in the EU. The aim of this section is, instead, to undertake a 
preliminary analysis of policy options for developing a more comprehensive and effective 
EU labour migration policy.  
 
The section is structured around four key dimensions, which have to be considered in 
advancing towards a comprehensive labour market approach to EU labour migration policy 
(see Table 4): 
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‐ First, policy tools to improve the labour and skills matching of international migration 
flows to the EU and EU labour market needs, hence ensuring efficiency of EU labour 
migration policy, basically through information and institutional tools.  
‐ Second, policy measures to ensure the optimization of the labour force already in the 
EU. This will contribute to the overall efficiency of EU labour markets and defuse 
potential opposition to a more open labour migration policy in the EU (see Box 3). This 
would involve strategies to integrate non-economic migrants (including family members, 
refugees and foreign students), facilitating the intra-EU mobility of third-country 
nationals, and responding to irregular migration with targeted regularizations based on 
the systematic analysis of the social and economic effects of regularizations in the EU 
members states.  
‐ Third, a review of the existing EU labour migration entry channels to overcome the 
paradox between the need for international labour migration given the impending 
demographic crisis in Europe and the lack of commensurate policy instruments to attract 
and integrate labour migration from third countries. In this regard, it is important to 
ensure a policy mix attracting the migrant workers to the EU with the required skills, 
including low-skilled migrants when needed.  
‐ Fourth, instruments geared to extending the pool of potential labour migrants are 
needed to ensure a flexible and quick response in real time to developments in EU 
labour market needs: this would optimize the abovementioned new EU labour migration 
entry channels and labour and skills matching tools.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the EU labour migration policy options briefly analysed in this section. 
 
Table 4. Policy dimensions and options for a EU labour migration policy 
Labour matching An EU-wide Labour Market Information System 
An EU labour market needs forecasting system integrating 
migration flows and non-economic migration 
International Labour Matching Information Systems 
EU list of certified recruitment agencies 
Optimizing existing 
labour force 
Labour market integration of non-economic migrants (family 
reunification, refugees, foreign students) 
Intra-EU Mobility of third-country nationals 
Targeted regularization of irregular migrants 
Labour migration entry 
channels 
Highly-Skilled migrants: Reforming the Blue Card 
“Expression of interest” or point-based migrant pre-selection 
Targeted and occupation-specific Job Search Visas 
Extending the pool of 
potential labour migrants 
Work possibilities for foreign students 
EU Traineeship Programme 
Recognition of qualifications (including EU Skills Certification 
Office) 
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6.1. Labour matching 
 
6.1.1. An EU-wide Labour Market Information System 
Description and justification. The emerging EU-wide single labour market requires an 
EU-wide labour market information system (LMIS) to help make informed policy decisions 
and ensure EU-wide labour market matching. The EU-wide labour market information tools 
developed so far build a coherent whole, but do not amount to an integrated EU LMIS: such 
tools include European Employment Observatory, EU Labour Force Survey, European 
Vacancy Monitor, EU Skills Panorama, Cedefop Skills Forecast, the European Job Mobility 
Portal and EURES. In particular, this LMIS should integrate an EU Employment Information 
System aggregating the information available on labour supply and demand throughout the 
EU, particularly at the level of national public employment services (as an underpinning of 
effective intra-EU labour mobility). 
 
On the other hand, an EU-wide LMIS of this kind would be the only way to operationalize 
the EU preference principle by conducting EU-wide labour market tests (see Box 2): i.e., a 
verification that there is not EU national worker with the required qualifications available at 
prevailing working conditions to fill a specific vacancy. In a EU labour market with free 
movement of workers and an EU preference (see Box 2), it does not make sense to keep 
applying national labour market tests based on national labour market information systems 
(those managed by public employment services) registering only national workers. A 
thorough research on how labour market tests are applied and how they work at national 
level could build the basis for developing an effective EU-wide labour market test. Such EU-
wide labour market test to implement the principle of EU preference would be a way to: 
defuse political sensitiveness to opening up labour migration opportunities to third-country 
nationals (making sure that labour immigrants do not displace EU workers, see Box 3); 
linking intra-EU labour mobility with EU-wide labour migration policy; and fully integrating 
non-economic migrants with access to the EU labour market into the EU labour migration 
policy framework. Even if experience with labour market tests is very varied at the national 
level across the EU (see EMN 2015b), this is so far the only instrument we have to link 
labour market needs and labour migration policies. As such, to develop some form of it at 
EU level would greatly contribute to supporting the operationalization of a true EU labour 
migration policy and would help overcome the current segmentation of EU labour markets 
(and hence labour migration policies).  
 
An EU LMIS would ideally involve an enhanced cooperation and coordination of work 
between several existing agencies and initiatives. Eurostat provides quarterly EU Labour 
Force Surveys and data on employment permits issued and data on vacancies. The 
European Vacancy Monitor provides up-to-date information about demand by jobs but also 
regions/countries. The European Employment Policy Observatory focuses on policy design, 
implementation and evaluation. Information coming from all these different sources should 
be integrated and jointly analyzed.  
 
But, more crucial for the development of an EU LMIS would be the development of the 
EURES network into a true comprehensive employment information system on job offers 
and job-seekers across the EU. Currently, only a part of job offers available at national 
level are “uploaded” into the EURES system (depending on the decision of national EURES 
councilors and focal points). To progress towards a pan-EU LMIS, all information available 
for Member States’ public employment services should be integrated into an EU-wide 
Employment Information System.  
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Analysis and feasibility. What would the development of a pan-European Employment 
Information System (aggregating information on vacancies and job-seekers in all Member 
States) mean? Well, it would not require substantial administrative support at EU level, a 
new institutional setting, a change in the distribution of competences on employment policy 
or costly operational costs. It would simply draw the full consequences of the integration of 
EU labour markets brought about by the free movement of workers within the EU. The 
main challenge would be to develop a common technical platform compatible with current 
national employment information systems (in terms of language, use of standard ISCO 
codes…) and subsequently integrate them. In this regard, its implementation should be 
gradual and possibly asymmetrical across Member States (but obligatory once a Member 
State joins the system, what would require an ad-hoc legal framework to ensure the 
feeding and update of the system). This could be done on the basis of the current EURES 
portal, but making it comprehensive. As it is the case with EURES, the EU Employment 
Information System would be managed and implemented by national public employment 
services, in the framework of a common technical and operational framework and under 
the coordination of the European Commission (DG Employment). The only innovation would 
be to add an “information layer” aggregating information from all Member States’ public 
employment services. It would work much in the way that national and regional 
employment information systems work together in an integrated way in several Member 
States. The system could incorporate the lists of shortage occupations already existing in 
some EU Member States (EMN 2015b). It would be funded by national public employment 
services (in the framework of their current functions and budgets), since it would contribute 
to let them better perform their functions.  
 
In any case, it is important that the EU-wide employment information system integrates 
information on migrant workers legally residing in Member States. This would lead to a 
better use of the existing pool of labour. It would eventually facilitate the switch in status 
from non-economic to economic migrants (this is already possible in Sweden, for instance); 
or allow residence changes within the EU in function of the availability of work (and hence 
ensure the actual implementation of the EU preference principle, see Box 2). 
 
6.1.2. An EU labour market needs forecasting system integrating migration flows and non-
economic migration 
Description and justification. The EU Employment Information System would aggregate 
the information available on current labour supply and demand throughout the EU. But a 
labour market forecasting system, projecting labour demand and supply per country, per 
sector and per occupation, at an aggregate EU level, is a crucial stepping stone for the 
formulation of a truly evidence-based EU labour migration policy (see “Taking European 
Labour Market Forecasting to a Higher Level”, MPC and Peter Bosch 2015). Despite earlier 
attempts, the EU still lacks a serious labour market forecasting system capable of 
recognizing migration flows as an integral part of EU labour markets. Labour market 
projections need to provide information on: 1) future supply by occupation at Member 
State level in a no-migration scenario; 2) future demand for the same occupations; and 3) 
the labour force movements (from some occupations to others, intra-EU or from third 
countries) necessary for addressing supply-demand imbalances.  
 
This new approach would overcome the main drawbacks of current modelling approaches. 
The Cedefop model by forecasting the supply and demand for labour in all EU countries 
provides a preliminary measure of the gaps. However, the model is based on a forecast of 
the demand of goods and services, which is already a very difficult task, and the demand 
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for labour is derived from it. No development of labour market functioning or institutions 
nor innovations in the production systems are taken into account. No distinction between 
natives and foreign nationals is made. Nor are there any assumptions on future migration 
flows: so that migration is built into the projections, not calculated as a result of projections 
not taking it into account. This makes this approach difficult to use as a benchmark, in 
particular for labour migration policy purposes 
 
Analysis and feasibility. Such a forecasting system would not require a new institutional 
setting or costly investments, but upgrading the current exercises in the framework of 
Cedefop or the European Employment Observatory and integrating the current forecasting 
exercises already carried out in many Member States (see EMN2015b, Table A2.4). The 
main change would be largely technical, rather than political or institutional. The outcomes 
of this kind of forecasting exercise could be an important input for the public debate on 
labour migration needs in the European Union.  
 
This forecasting system should use the same methodology across different EU member 
states (current forecasting exercises are basically aggregations of national projections). It 
should take into account projected migration flows as fully as possible, including potential 
inflows of non-labour migration into the EU (family members, refugees, foreign students 
etc.) and their expected profiles. 
 
6.1.3. International Labour Matching Information Systems 
Description and justification. A logical way to facilitate the matching of labour supply 
and demand for migrant workers would be to extend current EU and Member States job 
intermediation mechanisms (notably public employment services matching systems) to 
third country nationals. An obvious step there would be to extend the European Job 
Mobility Portal, EURES, to third countries, in particular neighbourhood countries in the 
framework of Mobility Partnerships (so as to mark their “privileged” status in the field of 
migration). Even if the current working of EURES has many shortcomings, mainly due to 
the lack of comprehensiveness and institutional capacity to perform a labour market 
intermediation function, this extension would mark an important political message. This 
would provide citizens in partner countries with information about job vacancies in Europe 
(but also the corresponding job intermediation services, which should be upgraded and 
adapted to the specific needs of foreign workers). It would give EU employers a cost-
effective way to access this pool of potential labour. Alternatively, EURES, which works as a 
network for the EU’s public employment services, could be linked to the labour-market 
information systems of public employment services in partner countries. In this way, it 
would make recruitment possible.  
 
Similar systems are already operating effectively in Australia for skilled migration 
(SkillSelect http://www.immi.gov.au/Work/Pages/SkillSelect/SkillSelect.aspx, and in 
Canada www.hireimmigrants.ca). 
 
Analysis and feasibility. This can also be a good strategy to make international labour 
matching systems available to Small and Medium Enterprises: these have fewer resources 
to seek and attract foreign staff, and may otherwise need to use costly intermediary 
services to access international workers. In this way, they can make up for structural 
disadvantages in the competition for global talent.  
 
In this regard, OECD (2014) suggests matching employers and migrants in virtual space, 
using web portals and databases. A potential limitation of such online direct matching tools 
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is that it is limited to IT literate, i.e. younger and better educated migrants. For less skilled 
migrants job intermediation services will be required. 
 
Such an extension of national and EU job intermediation systems could fit into on-going EU 
external cooperation projects in the field of labour migration. The EU is funding several 
capacity building projects to develop labour market information systems and strengthen 
labour migration management institutional capacities in countries of origin (TEAM Project, 
Jordan, Ghana….). They are often implemented by public employment services in Member 
States (Pôle Emploi and Swedish public employment service, for instance). In this 
framework, some tests with job offers in Member States have been made (in Morocco and 
Tunisia) which have highlighted the challenges of this integration of information systems 
across countries (in terms of technological compatibility and format of offers, time 
constraints, expectations on candidates, pre-selection capacities…). They could form a basis 
to build on, but this would require the technical commitment of national public employment 
services in Member States and the political commitment of their authorities to facilitate the 
resulting legal labour migration, whereas the EU development cooperation funds could 
provide the funding under its current programmes. 
 
Two key related challenges are to complement international matching tools with 
international skills and qualifications recognition processes (particularly crucial for highly-
specialized and regulated labour market niches) – see Section 6.4.3 – and to skills 
development schemes. This would allow to make sure that skill gaps are filled so as for the 
matching to succeed (in terms of language proficiency but also in terms of vocational 
training).  
 
6.1.4. EU list of certified recruitment agencies 
Description and justification. One possible approach to securitize the international 
recruitment process and at the same time overcome the bureaucratic restraints of public 
employment services would be the following: establish a list of private employment 
agencies with certifications assuring high standards of service and protection of migrant 
workers. This would require the detailed regulation of the work and activity of such 
international private employment agencies, including issues related to direct and indirect 
fees that can be charged to migrant workers in order to eliminate abuse practices. 
Regulations would also define the relationship between the migrant workers, agencies and 
employers, and ensure that immigrants receive full information about their rights. 
Certification would provide common quality standards for agencies operating in different 
countries of origin. By promoting best practices, certification would also enhance 
competition on the recruitment agencies market. 
 
A similar system would be to establish a list of “trusted” recruiters or trusted employers 
who fulfill a series of criteria and who are able to recruit internationally through a fast track 
system (hence reducing costs in international recruitment). An inspiring practice in this 
regard comes from the Netherlands, where employers wishing to hire migrants may apply 
for a recognition as a sponsor. This “trusted recruiter” status is optional if certain conditions 
are met and it requires completion of a procedure outlined by the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service (IND). Recognized sponsors have advantages including: faster 
admission procedure (decision on an application can be taken by the IND sometimes within 
two weeks); less documentation requirements (in some cases the statement of the 
employers will be sufficient); and the assignment of a dedicated contact point in the IND 
(see https://ind.nl/EN/business/employer/working-as-employee/recognition-sponsor).  
 
 66 
Analysis and feasibility. The successful regulation of recruitment agencies should be 
analysed in relation to: 1) how much regulation is really needed; 2) addressing actual 
sources of exploitation and abuse; 3) cooperation between sending and receiving contexts, 
which is required considering the agencies operate in-between the two (Agunias 2013). 
This kind of approach has been successfully implemented in Asia (where private 
recruitment agencies play an important role in international migration, for instance in the 
Gulf countries). There are also some recent global initiatives in this field to which it would 
be possible to link, such as the International Recruitment Integrity System launched by the 
International Organization for Migration (http://iris.iom.int/) or the Fair Recruitment 
Initiative set up by the International Labour Organization 
(http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/fair-recruitment/lang--en/index.htm).  
 
In the current legal framework, only Member States can create their own lists of certified 
recruitment agencies. Nevertheless, taking into account the intra-EU mobility of workers, 
some form of coordination at the EU level might be envisaged. There is even the possibility 
of the development of an EU-wide common framework, for instance through an EU 
Directive setting minimum standards. 
6.2. Optimizing existing labour force in the EU 
 
6.2.1. Labour market integration of non-economic migrants (family reunification 
beneficiaries and refugees) 
Description and justification. As highlighted in Section 4.2., most non-economic 
migrants end up entering the labour market. However, their integration into the labour 
market poses bigger challenges, for instance in terms of overqualification, than in the case 
of economic migrants (see Figure 11 above). Since up to 80% of first residence permits 
granted to third-country nationals in the EU are for non-economic reasons (see Figure 1), 
this is a huge largely untapped labour force. Integration into the labour market of third-
country nationals already present in the EU would have a positive effect for public 
perceptions of migration. It would, after all, challenge discourses about abuses to the 
welfare system and highlight their contribution to growth.  
 
Therefore, in the light of increased refugee inflows into Europe, in particular, it is essential 
that “increased and directed integration resources to accompany larger intake of refugees” 
are mobilized (Bevelander and Irastorza 2014). Linking labour migration policy with family 
reunification and international protection would be a win-win strategy. But it would require 
the decompartimentalization of current migration flow management. For instance, reception 
conditions for asylum-seekers might be combined with temporary work programmes fitting 
their skills and qualifications (Long 2015). Access to work, even if temporary, may serve as 
a test of migrant skills, which may be a factor behind the effectiveness of wages and 
training subsidies (for Denmark see OECD 2007).  
 
Analysis and feasibility. A first step to optimize the labour market integration of non-
economic migrants is to have a thorough knowledge of their skills and their professional 
profile. Data on them are relatively easy to obtain, since by definition they go through 
Member States’ administrative systems, but there is a big deficit of knowledge about them. 
Integrating a simple question on the entry status of third-country nationals residing in the 
EU into the EU Labour Force Survey would greatly improve the level of knowledge we have 
about non-economic migrants. Research into the main obstacles to their labour market 
integration is also needed in order to inform policy in this field, and in particular migrant 
support measures in countries of origin (for family reunification beneficiaries,) or transit 
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(for refugees) and in countries of destination to facilitate their integration. These support 
measures may be designed taking into consideration labour market needs (in terms of skills 
for instance). Italy has implemented basic language and cultural pre-departure training for 
these migrants in around 30 countries of origin in the last few years, and this could be 
extended to genuine vocational training. 
 
Finally, easing the changes in migratory status from non-economic to economic migrants 
for family reunification beneficiaries and even possibly asylum-seekers already residing in 
the EU would greatly facilitate labour market integration. To the extent that those migrants 
are already present in EU societies, it would help defuse negative public perceptions about 
migrants. 
 
However, one issue to consider carefully in this context is the issue of incentives to work 
and labour market entry channels. The Swedish government, for instance, runs 
introduction programmes directed at family members during the first years after their 
arrival in Sweden. As the programmes are operated full-time, they delay labour market 
access of non-economic migrants. The labour participation rates grow over time, but they 
lag behind those of labour migrants and natives. Some of the reasons explaining this is the 
dual nature of the labour market in Sweden. Most of the labour market is highly regulated, 
where hiring and firing costs and minimum wage remain relatively high, thus hampering 
entrance to permanent positions. So the main route to employment for lower skilled non-
economic migrants without context specific skills may be through temporary contracts, but 
these do not ensure a good labour market integration. One way to ensure the economic 
progress of migrants is to combine these temporary jobs with training related to 
country/sector/occupation specific skills. The right training schemes will allow them to use 
temporary jobs as a stepping-stone to more skilled employment (Bevelander and Irastorza 
2014). 
 
6.2.2. Intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals 
Description and justification. Currently, third-country nationals legally residing in EU 
Member States enjoy equal treatment in principle after five years, and hence the right to 
free movement within the EU. The removal of physical borders among Member States also 
facilitates the circulation of other third-country nationals. However, as explained in Section 
3.1, this right in principle of TCNs to free movement within the EU after five years of legal 
residence or if they hold a EU Blue Card, for instance, is limited in practice by the wide 
discretion of Member States to impose national measures such as labour market tests 
(Article 5 of the Blue Card Directive and Article 14 LTR Directive). These legal barriers come 
on top of other material obstacles preventing intra-EU mobility both of TCNs and EU 
citizens, such as the limitations to the portability of social rights, language barriers or the 
lack of true European labour market, including a EU-wide job matching system. In any 
case, the actual size of intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals is difficult to quantify, 
given the lack of statistics, and in particular the problems of cross-national comparability. 
Existing evidence suggests that the volume of intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals is 
relatively limited, even if efforts were made in order to facilitate it for some groups of 
migrants: apart from those with long-term residence, Blue Card holders, students and 
researchers. However, conditions remain very different across Member States, and are 
subject to a high degree of discretion (see Section 3).  
 
This notwithstanding, third-country nationals already residing in a Member States are a 
potential untapped labour force resource to fill labour market needs in other Member 
States, in particular if they are unemployed or underemployed. Low levels of intra-EU 
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mobility among third-country nationals constitute a limiting factor to “a real European 
labour market”. Potentially mobility would improve the functioning of the labour market, 
which irrespective of high unemployment has persistently a number of hard to fill vacancies 
(1.5 out of 100) (EMN 2013; ETUC 2012). Given their migration experience, their labour 
market integration should be easier than for other third-country nationals.  
 
Analysis and feasibility. Some countries facilitate labour market mobility of third-country 
nationals by simplifying the procedures for labour market access and reducing 
requirements: this contrasts with newly arrived third-country nationals who have to obtain 
work permits and for whom labour market tests apply. Spreading this kind of simplified 
procedures could encourage the intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals who are 
already legally residing in other Member States and hence already present in the EU labour 
market. Extension of EURES services to all third-country nationals legally resident in the EU 
could also improve their access to information about jobs in the EU and consequently their 
mobility levels (for now only long-term residents formally have this right, see Pascouau 
2013). An information campaign about intra-EU mobility right should follow, not least 
because mobility right would make the EU a more attractive destination (EMN 2013).  
 
One obstacle to the intra-EU Mobility of third-country nationals would be a minimum wage 
required to obtain a residence and work permit, which in some countries is set to a higher 
level than for the EU citizens. Similarly, additional requirements from entrepreneurs and 
the self-employed may hamper the mobility of third-country nationals. In this respect, in 
particular in the case of seconded workers, it is important to establish safeguards to avoid 
exploitation and social dumping (such as the application of the work conditions agreed in 
sectorial collective bargaining or reinforced labour inspection). 
 
Recognition of qualifications may also pose a barrier to mobility, so the common EU 
standards could be a solution over the long term. In the short term, Pascouau (2013) 
proposes a more flexible system where recognition of qualifications could follow after three 
years of work experience in a given profession in one Member State. 
 
6.2.3. Targeted regularization of irregular migrants 
Description and justification. Irregular migrants, to the extent that they have (informal) 
jobs, fill a labour market need. Indeed, irregular migrants respond to high demand in 
particular, often low added-value, sectors (like domestic care and construction, and less so 
agriculture, see Section 2 above). But they distort the functioning of the labour markets, 
reducing tax revenues and undermining the work conditions of other workers. Targeted 
regularizations of third-country nationals working illegally, whenever they have jobs, can 
help to reduce the size of the black labour market. The basic principle should be that 
irregular migrants working in the EU are filling a labour market need, so the job should be 
formalized and the irregular migrants regularized. On the other hand, regularizations, as 
the only channel to enter the EU labour market, show the shortcomings of legal labour 
migration policy instruments.  
 
Considered as a successful intervention (even if widely criticized by some other Member 
States), regularization in Spain in 2005 was designed as a part of a plan to combat 
irregular employment. Thus, regularization was implemented along with amnesties for 
employers who had given jobs to irregular migrants and who were not paying taxes and 
social security. There were, also, workplace inspections and sanctions for employers who 
did not regularize their employees. Regularization followed broad social consultations that 
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took place with various stakeholders: trade unions, employer confederations and migrant 
organizations (Arango and Finotelli 2009). 
 
Analysis and feasibility. Regularization initiatives should be carefully prepared, however, 
in close cooperation with social partners (employers and employees) and done in a way so 
as to make sure that these regularizations do not attract new irregular migrants. The 
regularization could work as a “corrective device” (Brick 2011), to adjust to actual labour 
market needs for migrant labour. Bringing migrants into the formal economy should 
produce a positive impact on their working conditions and protection against unfair 
employer treatment. 
 
Although regularizations are currently within the competence of Member States, there is a 
role for the EU. Quantitative estimates and simulations of the possible impact of 
regularizations on tax revenues, social security payments but also other, non-tangible 
benefits and (possible) costs in terms of social cohesion might be a useful way to support 
the case for regularization. They would also make sure that they fit into the overall EU 
labour migration policy objectives: a classical example comes from the Spanish 
government, Sebastián 2006. In this respect, it would be important to carry out a 
systematic analysis of the (social and economic) effect of regularization in the EU Member 
States and to analyse the long-term results and effects of recent regularization campaigns 
in the EU. Regularization efforts have to take into account regularization experiences in 
different countries, their bases, scale and circumstances. 
6.3. Labour migration entry channels 
 
6.3.1. Highly-skilled migrants: Reforming the Blue Card 
Description and justification. There is a wide consensus that the EU should improve its 
channels for legal migration to meet its labour market needs, in particular for qualified 
workers. And the Blue Card, as a supposedly innovative tool to attract this specific category 
of migrants through a common regime for the whole EU, has an important role to play in 
this framework. Its demand-driven approach is also appropriate for a labour market with 
such high levels of unemployment among qualified workers in some Member States and a 
comprehensive system of welfare benefits. However, the EU Blue Card system does not 
respond, at least as it is presently configured, to the EU’s needs for highly-qualified labour 
(see Kalantaryan and Martín 2015). It is too costly for all parties involved: employers, 
beneficiary migrant workers and implementing States. It does not provide sufficient 
additional rights to make it attractive for potential beneficiaries: in terms of free access to 
the labour market of other EU Member States; right to family reunification or prospects of 
getting a permanent residence permit in the EU. Nor does it ensure real added value in 
relation to highly-qualified national migration schemes. This is reflected in the low numbers 
of applications and the low number of blue cards granted. As a labour migration 
instrument, it seems to be limited in practice to one country, Germany: Germany had 
lacked a legal migration scheme for highly-qualified third-country nationals and has a well-
identified need for university graduate workers. It is also largely limited to multinational 
companies with a European reach: small and medium companies seem to be all too often 
excluded because of the high cost, though there is no data on the distribution of Blue Cards 
across employer company types. 
 
Actually, many of the provisions of the Blue Card Directive, and the way transposition into 
national legislations was conceived, are geared to restricting the number of beneficiaries 
rather than to facilitating the matching between EU labour demand and international skilled 
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workers. As such, they tend to discourage talented workers rather than attracting them, in 
particular if these workers have alternatives.  
 
Analysis and feasibility. For the Blue Card to become a true EU-wide labour migration 
instrument, and some key policy reforms are outlined below (for a more thorough analysis, 
see (see Kalantaryan and Martín 2015): 
 
- One Blue Card giving access to the whole EU labour market. The Blue Card 
should revert to the original idea of one umbrella work permit for the whole EU: 
i.e., a single permit allowing for free movement and the right of establishment 
within the EU labour market. Access to the labour market of other Member States 
should be automatically guaranteed for beneficiaries of the Blue Card, after a short 
qualifying period in the job for which the Blue Card was granted (currently it is 
eighteen months, and access is not automatic). There should be no need for 
another administrative procedure to apply for it. This requires a higher level of 
harmonization (and maybe simplification) of Member State legislation: the one 
resulting from the Blue Card Directive, which has in fact led to multiple national 
Blue Card systems instead of a single one. There is no reason why this would 
cause “prejudice to the right of the Member States to determine the volume of 
admission of third-country nationals entering their territory from third countries for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment” (point 8 of the Preamble). It would 
not, then, require a change in the current distribution of competences. 
- EU Blue Card and national labour migration schemes can coexist without 
any dysfunction. If the objective is to develop a flexible system that is responsive 
to national and EU labour market needs as they emerge, the coexistence of several 
systems is not detrimental to the overall objective. Economic actors will seek in 
each case the scheme best adapted to their needs.  
- The cost of benefitting from the Blue Card should be reduced. The high salary 
threshold established (minimum of 1.5 of the average national salary, even if not 
all Member States respect this minimum) can only result limit the Blue Card to 
very specific cases (such as multinational companies). It also penalizes those 
sectors with lower than average salaries in the economy.  
- Rights attached to the Blue Card should be enhanced. Residence permits for 
family reunification for the relatives of Blue Card beneficiaries – one of the main 
advantages of the Blue Card in relation to national systems – should be granted at 
the same time that the Blue Card is given. On the other hand, the maximum 
period for granting the Blue Card should be extended to five years that would 
entitle beneficiaries to a permanent residence permit according to EU legislation.  
 
6.3.2. “Expression of interest” or point-based migrant pre-selection 
Description and justification. Among the three ideas for longer-term reflection on EU 
migration policy, the European Agenda on Migration refers to “A new model of legal 
migration: The EU Treaties reserve the final decision on the admission of economic 
migrants for Member States. However, the EU needs to look at how to marry this limitation 
with the collective needs of the EU economy. In particular, the Commission will look at the 
possibility of developing, with the Member States, an ‘expression of interest system’. This 
would use verifiable criteria to automatically make an initial selection of potential migrants, 
with employers invited to identify priority applicants from the pool of candidates, and 
migration taking place after the migrant is offered a job. This would allow for the creation 
of an ‘EU-wide pool’ of qualified migrants, accessible to both employers and Member States’ 
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authorities – but with the actual selection and the admission procedure remaining national, 
based on Member States’ actual labour market needs”.  
 
One possible reference system often mentioned in this regard is the express entry system 
which has been operating in Canada since the beginning of 201561. This is an online pre-
selection tool which collects permanent residence applications of prospective migrants, 
limited however to certain economic migration categories. Candidates can make 
applications at any time, and there is also no pre-established quota for Express Entry 
applications. Before submitting their application, candidates may check their eligibility 
online. If they are eligible, they can create their Express Entry profile. Profiles collect 
information about skills, work experience, language skills, and educational credentials. The 
ranking system also takes into account having a job offer (in particular one supported by 
Labour Market Impact Assessment) and a nomination from a province or territory. Ranking 
system is transparent and publicly known. Highest ranked applicants are invited to make an 
online permanent residence application within a 60 day period. Submitted applications are 
processed within six months. Express Entry applicants without job offer or province or 
territory nomination must register with Job Bank, otherwise their Express Entry profile 
expires. 
 
One advantage of Express Entry is initial pre-selection. It assesses the education of 
migrants, but not for migrants who have recently worked in Canada for at least one year or 
worked in a skilled trade. Moreover, the Express Entry provides the link between potential 
employers who cannot find Canadian or permanent resident workers to fill the vacancies 
and migrant workers. Express Entry provides fast processing times and efficient pre-
screening service. The system selects candidates that are most likely to be successful in 
their economic integration in Canada. Thus, the scheme seems to be particularly attractive 
to international students due to their young age, high education, language knowledge and 
work experience in the country. Due to job offer factor, employers’ needs are part of the 
system with hard to fill vacancies specially opened to migrant workers. Also, due to the 
province and territory nominations factor the system builds labour market needs 
permanent residence considerations.  
 
Analysis and feasibility. Even if the Commissions formulates this idea only as a point for 
future reflection, the implementation of such a system from an administrative point of view 
is unclear. As it is presented, it would entail the creation, within the European Commission, 
of a new labour migration administration, however small, to manage the system. Indeed, it 
would introduce an additional level of decision-making in the migration process: the EU 
making the initial selection, but Member States keeping the competence of admission. This 
would require the development of ad hoc administrative capacity.  
 
On a more general level, in Europe, a point or “expression of interest” system that would 
not be limited to candidates having a concrete job offer would risk increasing the pool of 
unemployed graduates. It might also displace EU nationals against the EU preference 
principle, substituting for intra-Community labour mobility. In the absence of a 
comprehensive welfare system for unemployed workers, the adjustment in the labour 
market usually happens through the acceptance of jobs and occupations under their level of 
qualification by national or migrant qualified workers. This is often the case in countries 
implementing a point system such as Canada or the UK. It leads to high levels of 
underutilization of skills of migrants. But in Europe this might actually mean more graduate 
unemployment and a heavier burden for the welfare state. 
                                          
61 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/express/express-entry.asp. 
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The analysis of EU labour markets shows that migrant labour needs do not target graduate 
workers at large: these have high levels of unemployment in several Member States, in 
particular in Southern Europe. They regard very specific highly-skilled occupational profiles, 
and any EU labour migration instrument should be geared to those needs. 
 
6.3.3. Targeted and occupation-specific Job Search Visa 
Description and justification. There is a clear need to develop a flexible, market-
oriented EU labour migration scheme able to respond to EU labour market needs, one that 
can ensure a smooth matching of international labour demand and supply in line with EU 
competences. An option to consider here might be some form of job search visa for specific 
categories of third-country nationals. This would be a visa granted to specific categories of 
potential labour migrants for a certain period (six months seems reasonable) to look for a 
job in the EU as a whole. If holders got a job offer in a Member State, the job would 
correspond to that State and its national regulation, according to the EU distribution of 
competences, to decide on the granting of a work permit. The beneficiary should leave EU 
territory when he or she does not get a job offer or work period within the validity period of 
the visa. Targeted, occupation-specific job search visas are a potential tool to attract talent, 
especially the young and skilled who do not possess work experience, but the stakeholders 
involved should be aware that not all job search visas will actually result in a migrant job 
seeker finding a job position, while those who are unsuccessful will not always leave the EU 
(OECD 2014). 
 
Analysis and feasibility. The risk would be of course for those job search visa holders to 
overstay their period of legal stay and become irregular migrants, but this system would at 
least open up a channel for legal migration to the EU (and potential overstayers would in 
any case belong to specific categories required by the EU labour market). On the other 
hand, the advantage of this system would be that it could be modulated so as to apply only 
to: certain occupations or professions (depending on EU labour market needs); certain 
nationalities (depending on EU migration policy dialogues with third countries, for instance 
in the context of Mobility Partnerships); or qualification profiles. It could even be combined 
with a quota system, as long as Member States continue to decide on numbers. Actually, 
job search visas could be granted exclusively, for instance, for TCNs with qualifications 
corresponding to shortage occupations as defined in the framework of the EU-wide LMIS 
(see Section 6.1). Unlike point systems, no permanent permit would be given to migrant 
workers without making sure that they have a job. Germany has been implementing, since 
2012, a similar system on a pilot basis for foreign workers with qualifications obtained in 
German institutions or recognized in Germany. But the scheme has been little used to date. 
This could be extended to any qualification granted or recognized in any Member State. 
Provided that there are effective mechanisms to implement the EU preference principle, the 
EU job search visa might contribute to striking an appropriate market equilibrium and 
balance between intra-EU mobility and international migration.  
 
Implementation in some European countries shows that the scheme does not necessarily 
lead to finding employment and in particular skilled employment (see Denmark, 
Netherlands and Norway in OECD 2014). The share of migrants who do not succeed to find 
a qualifying job during the search period remains high: the scheme was halted in Norway 
for this reason. This suggests that the selection process and design of selection criteria 
should be reconsidered in the light of actual labour market needs. Another challenge may 
be employers’ lack of trust in the skills of foreign workers. This is why a capped pilot 
scheme (limiting the total number of job search visas granted to identified vacancies in a 
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certain occupation, for instance) with carefully established criteria of eligibility could be 
usefully introduced. In a first stage, to ensure success some resources might be invested in 
the selection of the candidates (in the framework of EU development cooperation 
programmes, for instance). Such a pilot would allow an evaluation of both successful job 
searches and the numbers overstaying (OECD 2014). 
6.4. Extending the pool of potential labour migrants 
 
6.4.1. Work possibilities for foreign students  
Description and justification. The number of international students in Europe rose 
significantly over the 2000s. Eurostat data shows that one fifth of the first residence 
permits issued to third-country nationals were issued for education reasons (over 495,000). 
Study purposes (as per the Students Directive – in which Ireland and the UK did not 
participate) constituted 40% of these. Countries which issue most first permits for 
education reasons are the UK (around half of all permits issued), France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain. The EU attracted international students through policy dialogues with third 
countries, bilateral agreements and initiatives aimed at facilitating mobility and Joint 
Consortia Scholarships.  
 
The internationalisation of higher education is driving the process, but, as an EMN Report 
(2012) states, in many countries attracting students is closely linked to attracting talent 
and retaining a skilled workforce. Some countries define priority fields of study: e.g. 
engineering, business and law in France. However, international talent attracted by 
European universities is little utilised economically beyond the revenues to universities and 
services provided in local communities. Given the numbers of students involved, the fact 
that they are positively-selected, their European diplomas (easily recognised by employers) 
and their language skills there is a potentially useful pool here of highly-skilled workers. 
Drawing on this pool, though, would involve a clear and coherent strategy. In many 
Member States the policies regarding international students are divided between different 
ministries. Also, at least in some of the member states there is a general debate because of 
the ongoing recession and high unemployment levels, in particular among younger cohorts 
(EMN 2012). 
 
Employment options upon graduation may enhance the attractiveness of European 
destinations to third-country students. Whereas some countries provide for the possibility 
of obtaining a job-search visa after the end of studies, a number of countries allow 
international students to stay only if they have a job offer or only if they are continuously 
employed: requirements differ, of course, by country. Generally, requirements differ with 
regards to academic profile, minimum wage and access to capital (in case of the self-
employed). While there is space for the removal of some of these requirements, this should 
coincide with an information strategy about options to stay in the EU. In particular during 
the period upon graduation international students experience barriers to accessing 
employment (German case, see Morris-Lange and Brands 2015). 
 
Finally, impact of international students is also in the fact that they may bring their family 
members, also a potential pool of workforce. Many countries allow accompaniment of 
international students by family members (depending on the country lists of family 
members allowed for accompaniment differ, and there are also additional requirements) 
(EMN 2012).  
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Analysis and feasibility. In different member states legally worked hours for international 
students range between 10 in Luxembourg to 25 hours a week in Finland and Hungary, 
extended to full time work during public holidays. International students are not limited by 
legally worked hours in the Czech Republic and Sweden. However, the policies should not 
be limited to providing access to employment, but rather using skilled workforce potential. 
EMN report (2012) finds evidence that international students labour market participation is 
often part-time and in low skilled sectors of economy, suggesting that it is an income 
generating strategy rather than enhancement of skills and career prospects. In the UK 
there is more evidence of skilled employment in IT, engineering, banking and health 
sectors.  
 
Moreover, there is space for enhancing links between industry and academia in order to 
tailor international student programmes to labour market needs. There is some evidence of 
this already (EMN, 2012): 
 
 Academic programmes in response to labour market/strategic needs (Finland, 
Poland) 
 Work training programmes for international students (Finland) 
 Mentoring programmes (Austria) 
 Career services offered by universities (Netherlands, Poland) 
 
6.4.2. EU Traineeship Programme 
Description and justification. The development of an EU-wide traineeship scheme for 
third-country nationals, either already living in the EU, for instance as foreign students, or 
not, might be a less radical version of the above-mentioned job search visa. It would grant 
them a temporary permit for the period of the traineeship plus some additional months: 
Member States could establish national quotas for these kind of permits, in line with their 
competence in this field. In practice, since those trainees could move freely within the 
Schengen space, this would informally work as a job search visa, but targeted exclusively 
to vocational education and training or university graduates completing a traineeship period 
with an EU employer. 
 
There are already several interesting examples of international traineeship programmes in 
EU Member States. For instance, in Luxembourg a temporary residence certificate is offered 
to third-country nationals who come to the country for unpaid training (not employment) 
that exceeds three months. They may, however, be offered benefits (such as 
accommodation or food allowance etc.). Unremunerated training is understood as 
obligatory professional training. The training agreement has to be signed between the host 
and the trainee. Candidates need to apply in the country of origin, unless they are in 
possession of a residence permit in Luxembourg. Candidates need to prove they have 
sufficient resources for the traineeship period and for returning to their country of origin. 
Applications are processed within three months. Upon arrival to Luxembourg trainees have 
to apply for a residence permit that is given for the duration of the traineeship, but 
maximum for one year duration. Temporary residence permits do not include paid 
traineeships, as they require a work permit (websites of Le Gouvernement Du Grand-Duché 
de Luxembourg; Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes).  
 
In Belgium, work permits for trainees are offered for candidates between 18 and 30. They 
do not have to undergo labour market test, but traineeship must be a continuation of 
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education. Maximum traineeship period is one year and minimum remuneration 
requirements apply (Antoons and Pirotte 2013).  
 
In Germany, the Gesellschaft für international Zusammenarbeit has successfully 
implemented a project to place unemployed Tunisian engineers for six-month internships in 
German companies, benefitting from a EU Blue Card as work permit. 70% of the 100 
beneficiaries were subsequently offered a permanent job (see Martín et al. 2015).  
 
Analysis and feasibility. Such a programme could be designed and implemented at EU 
level, through a joint initiative. The period of such training should be between three and 
twelve months and it should be offered in areas with labour market needs in different 
sectors, occupations and regions. There should be requirements on maximum working 
hours and minimum wage levels, required language skills and qualifications… Ideally, the 
training programme could be used by employers to develop and test the skills of the 
trainees in the real work settings. The traineeship programme should also provide for 
options to fast change of status from trainee to worker upon successful completion of the 
training programme.  
 
Public acceptance of international trainees is much higher than for other categories of 
labour migrants as such, and hence this might become a “soft”, public-opinion-friendly way 
to expand legal labour migration to the EU. The traineeship period also offers employers 
the opportunity to test the skills and professional capacity of employment candidates.  
 
6.4.3. Recognition of qualifications (including EU Skills Certification Office) 
Description and justification. Measures addressing the assessment, certification, 
validation and recognition of (potential) migrants’ skills are crucial if one aims to reduce 
skill underutilization and brain waste. Still, efforts in this direction are limited. Building on 
existing programs in some Member States like Sweden, the EU should aim at promoting 
mechanisms (testing schemes) enabling swift and full recognition as well as portability of 
qualifications that migrants and people from a migrant background bring. To achieve this 
goal, deeper collaboration with the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and DG 
Education and Culture is necessary. 
 
Some form of assessment of qualifications could be applied already at the pre-departure 
stage, as a part of pre-screening tool. Also, some countries include recognition of 
qualification as a part of the introduction programme to newly arrived migrants. A one-stop 
shop for qualifications recognition could be set up. Also, process of qualifications 
recognition should involve employers to make sure that the skills respond to labour market 
needs. In Netherlands, for instance, diverse stakeholders have impact on skills assessment 
methods (employers organizations, trade unions etc.). Awareness about the importance of 
recognition should be raised among employers and migrants. This would be possible 
through information centres and portals (already operating in some countries). Holistic 
approach to qualifications recognition should also include language training (IOM LINET 
2012).  
 
Time cap on the recognition of qualification period should be clearly stated and observed. 
Data from Australia, Denmark and Italy suggests that recognition of qualifications has 
positive effect on employability and migrant careers. (Schuster et al. 2013). 
 
Analysis and feasibility. An important, related aspect, is the recognition of diplomas 
obtained in the EU by third-country nationals. Diploma recognition within the EU has been 
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approached so far as an issue of EU citizens’ rights rather than an issue of economic 
efficiency. EU citizens are entitled to the recognition of the diplomas, certificates and other 
professional qualifications that they have obtained in any Member State of the EU. But this 
equal treatment benefit only applies to third-country nationals if they are family members 
of Union citizens or are covered by specific Union legal acts (long-term residence, refugees, 
blue-card holders or scientific researchers). Even this is subject to quite restrictive 
conditions. The result is that the same degree granted by an education institution of a 
Member State obliges all other Member States to recognize it when granted to an EU 
citizen, but not necessarily if granted to a third-country national. This makes no economic 
sense, to the extent that it reduces the potential pool of qualified (migrant) workers from 
which EU employers can fill their vacancies, and hence is a significant obstacle in achieving 
the objectives of an EU labour migration and labour market policy.  
 
Pascouau (2013) suggests that Mobility Partnerships may provide the opportunity to 
discuss and implement recognition of qualifications, but so far this has been limited to 
general statements. Specific agreements with third countries should follow, regarding 
qualifications and diplomas offered by education institutions in these countries.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 A comprehensive labour market vision of the EU economic migration regime 
should, over the medium-term, replace the current sectorial, specific-
categories approach.  
 EU labour migration policy should be defined as an integral part of the EU 
labour market policy. This has implications for the current distribution of 
competences between DG HOME and DG Employment. 
 The operationalization of the EU preference principle should make it possible 
to establish a link between intra-EU mobility and international labour migration, as 
for employers they are perfect substitutes.  
 Social partners and social dialogue mechanisms are a necessary component 
of any EU labour migration initiative. They both define an EU labour migration 
policy responding to the actual needs of the labour market and help defuse 
misrepresentations of migrants in political discourse and public opinion.  
 A public information and communication strategy on the realities of 
migration and the need for a comprehensive labour migration policy at the 
EU level should be an integral part of any policy debate in this field: this is 
necessary given the strong anti-immigration attitudes in wide sectors of public 
opinion in many Member States.  
 The analysis of existing options allows to draw some conclusions on the right 
mix of policy instruments for a comprehensive labour market approach to EU labour 
migration policy in terms of new channels for legal labour migration to the 
European Union. The main objectives would be the following: ensuring more 
efficient international labour matching of migrant workers; optimizing the labour 
force already present in the EU; fitting legal migration channels to the needs of the 
European labour markets; and ensuring the availability of a sufficient pool of 
potential labour migrants for employers.  
 Legal labour migration opportunities to the EU should be integrated into EU 
migration agreements with third countries (such as Mobility Partnerships), 
along with mechanisms to facilitate the labour and skills matching for migrant 
workers from those countries. This would allow the articulation between EU labour 
migration policy and EU external cooperation in this field. 
 Finally, more research and the better production of data are crucial 
components of any evidence-based effective labour migration policy at EU 
level. In particular, more research is needed in the following areas: labour market 
integration of non-economic migrants; patterns of intra-EU mobility of TCNs legally 
residing in the EU, and mechanisms to better match the profile of labour migrants to 
the need of the EU labour markets. Experience in the implementation of labour 
market tests in different EU Member States, their relative performance and the 
potential for an EU-wide labour market test should be further explored. 
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A comprehensive labour market vision of EU economic migration regime. The 
current piecemeal, category-specific approach to legal labour migration at the EU-level 
analyzed in Section 3 has advanced this field against the protracted resistance of some 
Member States: regimes have included the EU Blue Card for highly-qualified migrants, 
intra-corporate-transfers, foreign students and seasonal workers. This fragmentary 
approach can, indeed, contribute to some, very specific, short-term needs. However, it 
does not provide the comprehensive vision of the EU labour market and the role of labour 
migration required in view of the gradual unification of EU labour markets: this is a clear 
trend, fully in line with EU economic integration process, even if it is still very incomplete 
and clogged up by the economic crisis. The European Commission proposed, in 2001, a 
Directive on admission for economic purposes but this was rejected by the Member 
States62. The current work on the European Agenda on Migration could be the appropriate 
framework to bring back that holistic vision (of course, adapting it to current needs and 
circumstances), but so far it is not being the case. 
 
EU labour migration policy should be defined as an integral part of EU labour 
market policy. As such, it should incorporate measures to facilitate the labour market 
integration of all flows of third-country nationals into the EU labour markets. This should 
include family reunification beneficiaries, refugees and foreign students. Their transition 
into the EU labour market should be supported by pre-departure and post-arrival training 
as well as skill-development programmes and specific job search support services. The 
design of these migrant support measures should be based on a sound understanding of 
why they fail to integrate into the EU labour market. Along the same lines, EU labour 
migration needs should be determined, taking into account those flows as well as potential 
intra-EU mobility of EU nationals from other Member States. This would require a 
comprehensive EU-wide labour market information system (see Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). 
EU labour migration policy should be flexible enough to respond to EU labour market needs 
and to match the work permits granted to migrant workers to those needs, discriminating 
between temporary and permanent labour market needs.  
 
An operationalization of the EU preference principle. This is crucial to ensure the 
smooth implementation of any EU-wide labour migration scheme and the articulation 
between international migration and the intra-EU mobility of EU nationals. Both are, 
indeed, perfect substitutes for employers in the labour market. It is necessary then to 
develop, as a complementary measure, the modalities of implementation of the EU 
preference (see Box 2 above), both for EU nationals of other Member States and for third-
country nationals legally residing on a permanent basis in other Member States; this 
includes family reunification beneficiaries, refugees and former labour migrants63. However, 
that would pose a major policy challenge, in as much as the implementation of a EU-wide 
labour market test does not seem feasible: consider the current fragmentation of the EU 
labour market and in particular of EU public employment services. A fully-fledged EU-wide 
Labour Market Information System would be required, on the basis of current national 
public employment services information systems, in order to make such an EU-wide labour 
market test possible (see Section 6.1.1).  
                                          
62 COM(2001)386, “Conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of paid 
employment and self-employment economic activities”. 
63 The EU or Community preference in the labour market was defined in the following terms by a Council 
Resolution of 20 June 1994 on the limitation on admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the Member 
States for employment: “Member States will consider requests for admission to their territories for the purpose of 
employment only where vacancies in a Member State cannot be filled by national and Community manpower or by 
non-Community manpower resident on a permanent basis in that Member State and already forming part of that 
Member State’s regular labour market”. 
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Social partners and social dialogue mechanisms are a necessary component of 
any EU labour migration initiative. They can contribute both to avoid abuses of migrant 
workers and to defuse misrepresentations leading to the political manipulations of 
migration issues (see Box 3 on public attitudes to migration in the EU). In the European 
Commission’s European Agenda on Migration, this issue has been taken up through a 
commitment to “establish a platform of dialogue to include input from business, the trade 
unions, and other social partners, to maximize the benefits of migration for the European 
economy and the migrants themselves”. The Commission should create separate platforms 
(or sectorial labour migration councils) with different sectors of the economy. In this way, it 
can hope to get a firsthand understanding of labour needs, and a more comprehensive 
European platform for a structured social dialogue on migration and employment at the EU 
level. In this way, policies will be directly connected to the labour market realities of vital 
parts of the European economy and adjustments can be made in a timely manner.  
 
A public information and communication strategy on the realities of migration and 
the need for a comprehensive labour migration policy at the EU level should be an 
integral part of any policy debate in this field, given the strong anti-immigration attitudes in 
wide sectors of public opinion in many Member States. 
 
Institutional issues have not been dealt with in this report, but they play an important 
role. Within the European Commission, all forms of migration to the EU, including economic 
migration, are still under DG Migration and Home Affairs. However, the effects of migration 
flows are felt mainly in the EU labour markets, and from an economic point of view they 
cannot be dissociated from the EU employment policy and the free movement of labour, 
which are dealt with by DG Employment and Social Affairs. From a legal point of view, the 
Lisbon Treaty established that the EU is competent to regulate stay and entry conditions of 
third-country nationals to the EU (i.e., basically the conditions to obtain residence permits). 
Member States, meanwhile, keep the exclusive competence to determine the volume of 
admissions to their labour markets. This institutional setting has to be respected in any new 
EU initiative in the field of labour migration, but taking into account that, in an economic 
area with free movement of persons and increasing integration of labour markets, policy 
coordination between Member States is needed even in their exclusive field of 
competences. 
 
In terms of policy instruments to open new channels for legal labour migration to 
the European Union, the analysis of existing options allows the following 
conclusions: 
 
- An EU-wide Labour Market Information System and an EU labour market forecasting 
system integrating migration flows of non-economic migrants are the basis of any 
effective, evidence-based labour migration policy at the EU level (see Sections 6.1.1 
and 6.1.2) The former can be used to facilitate international labour matching for 
third-country nationals and to operationalize the principle of EU preference and to 
ensure a better matching of labour migration policy outcomes to the actual needs of 
EU labour markets (Section 6.1.3). It might also be a way to defuse public 
opposition to increased migration to the EU. 
- The role of private placement agencies in international labour migration matching 
should be enhanced and regulated, for instance through the development of a 
system of certified international recruitment agencies (Section 6.1.4). 
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- To optimize existing labour force in the EU, the labour market integration of non-
economic migrants has to be supported (Section 6.2.1). Intra-EU mobility of third-
country nationals legally working in EU Member States should be facilitated (Section 
6.2.2). Also, the regularization of irregular migrants, in cases where there is a 
labour market demand not covered by nationals or EU citizens, should be 
incentivized (Section 6.2.3).  
- Foreign students graduating in EU education institutions should have some 
opportunity to access the EU labour markets provided that there is demand for them 
(Section 6.4.1). An EU Traineeship Programme for third-country nationals might 
become a building block to facilitate the smooth integration into the EU labour 
market of third-country nationals with the required skills (Section 6.4.2). More 
generally, the recognition and certification of qualifications and skills obtained in 
third countries by third-country nationals should be made easier and progress 
towards an EU-wide recognition system (Section 6.4.3). 
- The on-going reform of the EU Blue Card should impose less costs on migrants and 
employers and grant more rights, in particular to intra-EU mobility, to Blue Card 
holders (Section 6.3.1). 
- Targeted, occupation-specific job search visas (Section 6.3.2) might be a more 
effective instrument to match EU labour migration policy to EU labour market needs 
than supply-driven “expression-of-interest” or points systems, as suggested in the 
European Agenda on Migration (Section 6.3.3).  
 
Legal labour migration opportunities to the EU should be integrated into EU 
migration agreements with third countries (such as Mobility Partnerships), as well 
as mechanisms to facilitate labour and skills matching for migrant workers from those 
countries. Indeed, for the sake of policy coherence it is important to ensure a smooth 
articulation between EU and Member State labour migration policy and EU external 
cooperation in the field of migration. According to the Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility, that sets the framework for EU policy in this area, legal (labour migration) is one 
of the four main areas for this cooperation, but so far it is the weakest in terms of 
implementation.  
 
More research and the better production of data are crucial components of any 
evidence-based effective labour migration policy at the EU level. In terms of 
migration and asylum data and policy review, a revision of Regulation 862/2007 on 
migration statistics should be undertaken. The current Annual Report on Immigration and 
Asylum elaborated by the European Migration Network (EMN 2015a) might be transformed 
into a fully-fledged EU-wide migration policy review mechanism, as is done, for instance in 
the field of employment policy, in the framework of the Open Coordination Method.  
 
More research is needed, specifically, in the following areas: 
- The labour market integration of non-economic migrants (family reunification 
beneficiaries, foreign students, refugees and asylum-seekers). Migration data and 
migration projections should, as a general rule, be disaggregated by channel of 
entry, including the EU Labour Force Survey. Understanding the reasons for the 
lower labour market integration of family members is crucial in developing an 
effective and coherent labour migration policy at EU level. The same is true of the 
migrant support measures that can be developed in countries of origin and 
destination to enhance integration. 
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- The patterns of intra-EU mobility of TCNs legally residing in the EU. We know too 
little on the mobility patterns of this group of workers, in particular since the 
outburst of the economic crisis in 2008, and current statistical systems do not 
capture those movements properly.  
- Another labour migration policy area requiring further research are the mechanisms 
to better match the profile of labour migrants to the EU labour market needs. This 
includes the development of better forecasts at national and particularly at the EU 
level (see Section 2). There should also be thorough research on the feasibility, pros 
and cons, risks and potential performance of different targeted labour migration 
policy tools, such as job search visas, expression-of-interest or point systems, 
circular and seasonal migration schemes and other potential options.  
- The implementation of labour market tests in different EU Member States is an 
under-researched area. However, this is a key dimension of any concrete 
enforcement of the principle of EU preference (see Box 2), and as such might 
become an important tool in defusing strong public opposition to new legal avenues 
for migration to the European Union (see Box 2). The relative performance of 
different labour market test methodologies and the potential of an EU-wide labour 
market test should be further explored.  
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